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6EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
Europeans are, on average, better educated  
and live healthier, longer and more prosperous 
lives today than at any point in the past.  
However, this view on average achievements 
obscures large disparities, both within and 
between European countries. The income of  
the richest 20 % of households in Europe is  
on average 5 times higher than that of the poorest 
20 %, and up to 8 times higher in some Member 
States. Most indicators of well-being display 
a social gradient according to education level, 
occupation, income and social status.  
The Great Recession has reinforced existing  
socio-economic divides. Vulnerable groups  
– those with low education levels, the unemployed 
and individuals with a migrant experience – have 
largely borne the brunt of the resulting economic 
downturn and austerity programmes. Southern 
European countries were hit particularly hard.
Growing disparities on multiple socio-economic 
dimensions have contributed to a sense  
of unfairness and discontent in Europe. Recent 
data show that 38 % of Europeans do not believe 
that they are treated fairly and 41 % do not agree 
that they have enjoyed equal opportunities in 
life. Fairness is a subjective phenomenon, but 
the far-reaching consequences of perceptions of 
unfairness warrant a closer look at its drivers and 
underlying dynamics. The present report analyses 
some of the most pertinent dimensions of fairness 
in relation to the agenda for a fair, inclusive and 
social European Union (EU). 
Chapter 2 describes Europeans’ perceptions  
of fairness and how they vary across countries 
and socio-economic groups. The chapter also 
discusses how perceptions of fairness relate to 
the functioning of society and to individual well-
being. Chapter 3 presents some stylised facts on 
income inequality for the whole EU before, during 
and after the Great Recession. The dynamics 
of income inequality are shown for the entire 
income distribution as well as for different income 
sources in the EU as a whole, but also for three 
macro-regions. Chapter 4 discusses inequality of 
opportunity – a key structural inequality in society 
– through the study of persistence of educational 
attainment levels across generations. The analysis 
goes beyond most existing evidence by considering 
persistence across three generations rather 
than only two. The second part of the chapter 
explores individual perceptions of social mobility 
and beliefs about equality of opportunity. After 
the examination of inequality of outcomes and 
opportunities in Europe, Chapter 5 provides some 
perspectives and evidence on welfare  
state arrangements and tax-benefit systems:  
the distributional impacts of tax reforms, 
individual tax evasion behaviour, corporate 
tax avoidance behaviour and aspects of social 
protection in changing labour markets.  
Chapter 6 concludes this report.
Perceptions of fairness vary widely across 
EU countries and socio-economic groups
While about half of all European adults think 
that life is generally fair, perceptions of fairness 
are rather low in many countries of Southern and 
Eastern Europe: only 39 % in Bulgaria and Cyprus, 
36 % in Croatia and 26 % in Greece think that life 
is generally fair. By contrast, corresponding figures 
are much higher in the Benelux, Western European 
and (especially) Nordic EU Member States. 
Executive summary
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vary across countries and macro-regions  
but also by socio-economic characteristics. 
Individuals with higher education and income 
levels are more likely to perceive life to be fair, 
compared to the unemployed and elderly  
(see Figure 2.1 on p. 21).
At the country level, perceptions of fairness 
correlate more strongly with people’s beliefs 
about income inequality than with actual levels. 
This is because individual assessments of 
fairness are filtered through a dense net  
of perceptions, preferences, values and beliefs. 
People tend to misperceive inequalities,  
and differ in terms of the level of inequality  
they consider acceptable. 
Perceptions of unfairness need to be heard  
and acted upon, since fairness is linked  
to general well-being. Chapter 2 argues  
that the advantages of a fair and inclusive 
society need not come at the cost of less  
efficient economies and weaker growth.  
On the contrary, fairness and inclusivity  
can foster competitiveness and growth.
Income inequality at EU level has been 
stable since the Great Recession, but 
increased in Southern Europe
EU-wide labour income inequality across the 
EU was quite stable after 2007, while inequality 
of household incomes even declined. In North-
Western Europe, household income levels decreased 
proportionally among all income groups. Income 
inequality in this macro-region was stable and 
relatively low. By contrast, inequality in Southern 
Europe increased significantly from 2007 onwards, 
peaking in 2014. People at all income levels 
experienced income losses; for the poorest 10 % 
in Southern Europe, incomes decreased by at least 
30 % between 2007 and 2014. The rise of income 
inequality across Southern Europe is mainly due to 
a growing income gap between median earners and 
the poor. State and intra-household redistribution 
prove to be important insurance mechanisms 
against income shocks (see Figure 3.5 on p. 36).
Incomes converged across  
EU macro-regions
Between 2007 and 2016, income levels  
in the EU converged. In Central and Eastern 
Europe, the countries with the lowest income 
levels in 2007, incomes increased in almost all 
percentiles of the distribution, while Southern 
Europe experienced a large income reduction  
and a rise in income inequality. Varying patterns  
of income change and income inequality were 
likely caused by different exposure and sub-
sequent reactions to the financial crisis.
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across generations
In Europe, individual fortunes often depend on 
family socio-economic background. A child born 
to a parent with a tertiary degree is on average 
43 percentage points more likely to obtain a 
tertiary degree him- or herself compared to 
someone born to less highly educated parents. 
The persistence of social status of this kind  
has a dynastic component: If grandparents are 
included in the analysis, the advantage increases 
by 9 percentage points on average in the EU  
(see Figures 4.1 and 4.2 on pp. 47 and 49).
Social mobility differs between European regions. 
In Eastern, Western and Southern Europe, the 
persistence of educational attainment across 
generations is stronger than in Northern 
Europe and the Baltics. In Northern Europe, the 
offspring of more highly educated parents and 
grandparents have on average a 24 percentage 
points higher probability of completing higher 
education relative to those with less highly 
educated parents and grandparents. This figure 
increases to 57 percentage points in Southern 
Europe, indicating low levels of social mobility. 
Educational persistence has not changed 
substantially across birth cohorts, suggesting 
that limited progress has been made in ensuring 
equal opportunities in Europe.
The experience of upward mobility 
strengthens belief in meritocracy
Since individual decisions are largely based on 
attitudes, beliefs and perceptions, subjective 
information can complement objective indicators 
of social mobility, such as changes in educational 
attainment. In the EU, 33 % of individuals consider 
that they have moved up the social ladder 
compared to their parents, while about 23 % 
consider that they have moved down. The share 
of respondents reporting upward mobility varies 
between 41 % in Northern Europe and 31 % in 
Southern Europe. About half of the respondents 
identify themselves as being on the same level  
of the social hierarchy as their parents.  
Data also show that individuals with  
a perception of upward social mobility  
are less inclined to believe that success in  
life is a consequence of family circumstances  
and are more likely to attribute it to individual 
effort (see Figure 4.5 on p. 54).
Welfare states in the EU are under pressure
The social model of European welfare states is 
unique in providing collective insurance against 
risks which are only insufficiently insurable in the 
market. Most welfare states in Europe spend more 
than 50 % of their budgets on social protection, 
health and education. 
Structural changes driven by technological 
developments, globalisation and demographic 
change create new demands and challenges  
for existing welfare states. Across the EU, 
the traditional full-time, open-ended employment 
relationship is becoming less common, while 
atypical work forms, such as temporary jobs, part-
time work, casual work and solo self-employment, 
are becoming increasingly important. Between 
2002 and 2017 the share of atypical workers in  
the EU rose by 4 percentage points, from 38 %  
to about 42 %. This workforce often does not 
contribute to or benefit from basic social protection  
(see Figure 5.4 on p. 64).
Tax policy can be a lever for greater  
equity and efficiency
Central and Eastern European economies with 
flat personal income tax schedules could achieve 
greater equity and efficiency by moving towards 
more progressive personal income tax schedules. 
Wealth is more unequally distributed than market 
incomes, but is left largely untaxed in most EU 
economies. The redistributive effect of wealth taxes, 
as currently designed, appears to be negligible.
Tax evasion and tax avoidance are major concerns 
for EU Member States’ fiscal policy: for example, 
in the web-based economy there is a mismatch 
between the place where economic activity occurs 
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avoidance is facilitated by a corporate taxation 
system which is not adapted to today’s fluid  
and intangible economies. 
Similarly, tax evasion violates basic principles  
of tax justice. All this limits the capacity of welfare 
states to uphold their part of the social contract. 
Policy interventions targeting tax evasion  
and tax avoidance have the potential to foster  
fairer societies and raise additional revenue for  
the provision of welfare services and public goods.
The JRC agenda for social fairness in Europe
Moral considerations of fairness and justice are 
relevant to many facets of life. From within-family 
relative bargaining power and resource sharing to 
community interactions, from the local provision 
of public goods to the mitigation of and adaptation 
to climate change, questions of responsibility, 
distribution and redistribution are omnipresent. 
With the intention of contributing to a broad, 
European-wide debate on fairness, this report 
presents and synthesises recent research findings 
on perceptions of fairness, European-wide income 
inequality, persistence of educational attainment, 
social policy and taxation. 
Other central issues such as gender  
and environmental inequalities are being  
tackled in current and future JRC research.
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PREFACE
Three years ago, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
initiated a multi-annual research project on 
fairness. The first two years were marked by the 
publication of the first Fairness Report, the launch 
of a Community of Practice on Fairness, and the 
commissioning of a special Eurobarometer survey on 
‘Fairness, inequality and intergenerational mobility’. 
The first JRC report on fairness, ‘What makes a fair 
society? Insights and Evidence’, was published at 
the end of 2017 with the aim of addressing the 
multiple dimensions of fairness and identifying 
data and knowledge gaps. By focusing not only on 
short- and long-term trends in income inequality 
but also on inequality of opportunities and spatial 
disparities across a range of areas, including health 
and education, the report contributed to building 
a multidisciplinary knowledge base to support the 
European Commission’s agenda on fairness.  
The report acknowledged the need to monitor 
perceptions of fairness.
The Community of Practice on Fairness organised 
four workshops in 2017/2018, engaging 
policymakers and academics in a dialogue on 
fairness-related topics. This dialogue continued 
with three events in 2019 (see Annex 1).1 
The JRC commissioned a special Eurobarometer 
survey to better understand citizens' views on 
fairness, inequality and intergenerational social 
mobility. The survey covers, among others, 
respondents’ views on fairness in life, equality 
in the justice system and in the application of 
political decisions, opportunities to get ahead in life 
and respondents’ family backgrounds. The main 
results of the survey were published in April 2018.2 
This recently collected data on fairness provides 
the opportunity to study several facets of fairness, 
some of which are discussed in this report. 
Since the publication of its first report on fairness, 
the JRC has worked, inter alia, on the distribution 
of income across and within EU Member States, 
fairness-related impacts of tax and benefit 
systems, the dynamics of income inequality, 
social mobility across and within generations, 
the drivers of income inequalities and fairness 
perceptions. JRC research findings were 
disseminated through a series of Science for 
Policy Briefs on Fairness, launched in autumn 
2018. These policy briefs are available on the 
Fairness Science Hub (https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/
research/crosscutting-activities/fairness)  
and listed at the end of this report (see Annex 2).
11 Preface
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SUMMARY
Growing disparities in multiple dimensions have contributed to a sense of unfairness, 
arousing anger and discontent. Although fairness is in the eye of the beholder, the far-
reaching consequences of perceptions of unfairness call for a closer look and careful 
considerations of some of the drivers and underlying dynamics of inequalities and 
fairness perceptions alike. This report contributes to the public discourse on fairness 
and provides evidence to support the European political agenda on social fairness.
1. The importance of fairness
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THE IMPORTANCE 
OF FAIRNESS 
On average, Europeans are better educated, 
healthier, live longer, and have more prosperous 
lives today than at any time previously. However, 
this average perspective hides the fact that not 
everyone is equally well-off. Life expectancy 
ranges from 75 to 83 years across EU Member 
States. Individuals with a tertiary education live 
on average five years longer than those with at 
most a lower secondary education.3 Education 
depends, to some extent, on family background: 
individuals whose parents went to university are 
three times more likely to obtain a university 
degree themselves compared to other individuals. 
The income achieved by the richest 20 % of all 
households is five times higher than that received 
by 20 % of the poorest households. This number 
varies between three and eight times depending 
on the specific Member State. Emotional poverty 
in the form of social isolation and loneliness is 
unevenly distributed across Europe and comes 
with poor health and unfavourable economic 
circumstances. Most indicators of well-being 
display a social gradient along education, 
occupation, income and social status. The Great 
Recession reinforced this socio-economic divide. 
Southern European countries were hit harder 
than the rest of Europe and vulnerable groups – 
low educated, unemployed or individuals with a 
migrant experience – largely bore the brunt of the 
economic downturn and austerity programmes. 
Economic hardship and rising inequalities in 
many dimensions have contributed to fuelling 
anti-elite sentiment and discontent. For example, 
the yellow-vest protests in France were triggered 
by a regressive tax on petrol, which was perceived 
as unfair. Recent tax-avoidance scandals have 
revealed that large companies do not bear their 
‘fair’ share of the burden, reinforcing anger  
and sentiments of unfairness. Data shows that 
38 % of Europeans do not believe that they are 
treated fairly and 41 % do not agree that they  
have equal opportunities in life. 
Perceptions 
of unfairness 
have fuelled 
discontent.
   38 % of 
Europeans do  
not believe that 
they are treated 
fairly and 41 %  
do not agree that 
they have equal 
opportunities  
in life.
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The sentiment of unfairness among EU citizens 
creates political, social and economic challenges 
which together have the potential to undermine 
European values and possibly even liberal 
democracy.4 To foster a pan-European fairness 
narrative, it is important to replace averages  
with distributions when monitoring and evaluating 
European policies. The second JRC Fairness Report 
does not propose a remedy for unfairness. It aims 
to contribute to a diagnosis of the phenomenon 
to support the Commission's political agenda on 
social fairness.
There are also positive signs that offer reasons  
for hope. Trust in the EU and in national 
governments fell from 2007 until 2013, but these 
trends are being reversed and individuals’ trust in 
these institutions is rebounding (see Figure 1.1). 
As of 2018, the number of young people with a 
positive image of the EU was at its highest level 
since 2002. European citizens also voted in much 
larger numbers in the last European elections in 
May 2019, ending the relentless decline in voter 
turnout since the first popular election of the 
European Parliament. Labour market indicators 
also paint a positive picture.  
Employment is approaching the Europe 2020 
target of 75 % and the unemployment rate  
in the EU dropped to 6.3 % in autumn 2019, 
reaching its lowest level since 2000. 
Social fairness is high on the EU agenda.  
In the political guidelines, President  
von der Leyen of the European Commission 
committed to put forward an action plan to fully 
implement the European Pillar of Social Rights.5 
By supporting a set of 20 rights and principles 
to ensure equal opportunities, access to labour 
markets, fair working conditions, universal social 
protection and inclusion, the European Pillar 
of Social Rights is a significant step towards 
anchoring a broad social dimension in the 
European political agenda.6 Since its adoption  
in 2017, the Commission has launched a number  
of initiatives to foster fairness.7 More recently,  
the Commission published a roadmap to fully 
implement the European Pillar of Social Rights. 
In the related Communication, the Commission 
re-emphasises the importance of striving for 
more social fairness and equality and presents 
a number of possible initiatives, such as the 
establishment of a European Child Guarantee  
Figure 1.1: Share of individuals expressing trust in the EU and respective national governments
Notes: Data refer to the share of respondents reporting that they trust the EU/national government  
in their country. The EU average is calculated for each year including only those EU Member States  
at the time and using target and population weights. 
Source: JRC calculations based on standard Eurobarometer waves from 2001 to 2018.
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or a European unemployment benefit reinsurance 
scheme.8 The European Green Deal proposes  
a new growth strategy which also stresses  
the importance of a just and inclusive transition.9 
This report provides quantitative evidence  
to support the European Agenda for a fair, 
inclusive and social European Union. The material 
is presented in four main chapters. Chapter 2 
discusses perceptions of fairness in the EU  
and evaluates to what extent the inequality  
of both outcomes and opportunities matter  
when considering fairness. Data show that in 
Southern and Eastern Europe the perception 
that life is fair is in general rather low compared 
to the rest of Europe. The chapter argues that 
a fairer and more equal society enhances well-
being and the functioning of society. These 
advantages need not come at the cost of 
less-efficient economies and weaker growth. 
On the contrary, fairness and inclusivity have 
the potential to promote competitiveness and 
growth. Chapter 3 describes the patterns and 
dynamics of income inequalities in Europe 
before, during and after the Great Recession 
of 2008. The EU-wide measure of income 
inequality employed in this chapter highlights 
changes across the entire income distribution 
and for different income sources in the EU 
as a whole as well as for three EU macro-
regions. The results show that the crisis was 
particularly dire for the already less well-off in 
Southern Europe. Inequality in this macro-region 
increased significantly from 2006 onwards, 
mainly due to the rising income gap between 
the median earners and the poor. The Southern 
European poor were left behind and could not 
catch up after the financial crisis. In contrast, 
income inequality did not vary substantially in 
North-Western Europe and Central and Eastern 
Europe. Chapter 4 discusses a key dimension 
of inequality of opportunities, namely the 
transmission of educational inequalities across 
generations in Europe. Most of the evidence on 
social mobility has been rooted in a parent-to-
offspring paradigm. This chapter goes one step 
further and analyses the persistence of socio-
economic status across three generations. The 
persistence of educational attainment and social 
status is highest in Southern Europe and lowest 
in Northern Europe. Social status persistence 
has a dynastic component: an individual’s 
lifetime prospect is linked not only to the socio-
economic status of the parents but also to that 
of the grandparents. Given the relation between 
social status persistence across generations and 
the long-term dynamics of income inequality, 
fostering social mobility is all the more important 
for a well-functioning EU. 
After discussing inequalities of outcomes 
and opportunities, Chapter 5 provides some 
perspectives and evidence on welfare state 
arrangements and tax and benefit systems. 
Prevailing tax structures and the transfer system 
shape disposable incomes and wealth distributions 
in EU countries. In this context, ‘tax justice’ – i.e. 
corporations and citizens bearing their ‘fair’ share 
of taxation, without avoidance or evasion –  
is a key element in ongoing public policy debates.  
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  Economic 
hardship and  
rising inequalities 
in many dimen-
sions have 
contributed  
to fuelling anti-elite  
sentiment and 
discontent.
1. The importance of fairness
The chapter analyses several aspects of fairness 
in relation to EU tax systems: the distributional 
impacts of tax reforms, individuals’ tax evasion 
behaviour, corporations’ tax avoidance behaviour 
and aspects of social protection in new labour 
markets. Structural changes challenge existing 
national welfare state arrangements. There is 
room to revive the social contract through policy 
interventions on tax evasion, taxation of  
the digital sector, and adjustment of social 
protection systems to the new world of work. 
Chapter 6 summarises and concludes this  
second JRC Fairness Report.
Disclaimer
The quantitative results provided in this report 
should generally (unless stated otherwise) be 
interpreted as correlations. Correlations describe 
the direction and magnitude of a relationship 
between two variables. Albeit informative and 
capable of providing useful insights, correlations 
should not be confused with cause-and-effect 
relationships. The data and analysis in this report 
predate the UK leaving the EU. The analysis  
are thus including the UK. 
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When discussing fairness, the first conceptual 
challenge arises because of the difficulty of 
translating it from English to other European 
languages. Indeed, many languages do not have 
a direct word for ‘fairness’ but rather translate it 
as ‘justice,’ ‘justness’, ‘appropriateness’, ‘equity’ or 
‘equitableness’. In some European languages, ‘fair’ 
or ‘fairness’ has become a loanword, incorporated 
into the language without translation (Gulyas 2018). 
Fairness and equality are related but are not at all 
synonymous. Fairness relies upon certain normative 
criteria, whereas equality refers to the quality of 
being identical in status, value or quantity, which 
does not strictly require any normative criteria. Con-
cerns about fairness seem wired into human nature, 
from a child complaining that ‘it is unfair’ to adults’ 
discontent towards excessive inequality (Piachaud 
2008, Starmans et al. 2017). The difficulty in defin-
ing what is fair arises because fairness concerns are 
inherently subjective, i.e. what is viewed as fair and 
the importance attached to fairness varies from one 
person to another. On an abstract level, the concept 
of fairness suggests an ethical judgment about the 
box 1.1  Defining fairness
appropriateness of an object (behaviour, treatment, 
process or outcome) with respect to a subject (indi-
vidual or group). Given the multiplicity of ethical ar-
guments for appropriateness, as well as objects and 
subjects of fairness conceptualisations, fairness can 
mean a great many different things for the general 
public and for policymakers alike.
 
In the academic world, an often-encountered 
distinction is made between outcome based and 
procedural conceptions of fairness. The concept  
of procedural fairness is rooted in the seminal work 
of John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’ (1971) and 
refers to the process leading to the distribution of 
resources. Outcome-based fairness conceptions, 
on the other hand, relate to the actual distribution 
of these goods which include material goods and 
services but also benefits, taxes, or more general 
well-being-related outcomes. Inequalities in the 
distribution of any of these can be perceived either 
as justified (fair) or as unjustified (unfair). In Rawls’ 
and subsequent seminal works (Dworkin 1981a; 
Dworkin 1981b), equality of opportunity is an 
important criterion for fairness judgments.  
1. The importance of fairness
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In line with this, inequalities are fair as long as 
they are the consequences of factors for which 
individuals can be held responsible. Inequalities, 
however, which are rooted in circumstances beyond 
an individual’s control (such as gender, place of 
birth, family background) are unfair. Individuals 
must ‘play on a level field’, i.e. inequalities of 
opportunities should be eliminated or compensated 
for through public intervention. Several empirical 
studies (e.g. Konow 2003; Cappelen et al. 2007) 
confirm that indeed the distinction of factors 
within and beyond individuals’ control matters for 
fairness judgements. Nevertheless, a pluralism of 
fairness values prevails among individuals, with 
fairness ideals ranging from strict egalitarianism (all 
inequalities should be equalised) to liberalism (each 
person to get what she or he produces) with the 
equality of opportunity perspective in-between.10 
In a recent JRC study on concepts of fairness, 
Dewandre (2019) distinguishes between mutual 
fairness and social fairness. These two forms 
of fairness share the characteristic of being 
inherently relational. Mutual fairness is fairness-
as-equal treatment and relates to the outcome- 
and procedure-based notions of fairness. Mutual 
fairness is also literally about fair play, i.e. playing 
by the rules, avoiding cheating and fooling, being 
treated equally to others. This form of fairness 
echoes with the empirical findings by Lupfer et 
al. (2000). The authors show the importance 
of interpersonal fairness, i.e. how people are 
treated in interpersonal relations, for evaluating 
the fairness of an outcome. The second form of 
fairness – social fairness – is intended instead as 
fairness-as-solidarity. This is related to the fact 
that the meritocratic principle and associated fair 
inequality are only valid in a given range. If it is 
fair that one deserves what s/he has in function 
of his or her merits and efforts, the reverse is not 
necessarily true. Extreme poverty should not be 
seen as a fair outcome in any way; hence, providing 
access to basic resources for those in need is a 
fundamental form of fairness towards each other, 
despite and beyond the validity of the meritocratic 
principle. In line with Hufe et al. (2018), Dewandre 
(2019) thus argues that equality of opportunity 
alone is not enough to define fairness.
  The European 
Commission  
has put forward  
several initiatives  
aimed at fostering 
fairness.
1. The importance of fairness
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SUMMARY
Fairness is a value judgement that depends on individual characteristics and 
perceptions. This chapter provides insights into Europeans’ perceptions of fairness 
and how these perceptions vary across countries and socio-economic groups. About 
half of European adults think that their lives are fair. Yet, only 11 % strongly believe 
so and more than 20 % either disagree or strongly disagree with the statement 
that their life is fair. Although equality of outcomes (e.g. income inequality) have 
some influence on Europeans’ fairness perceptions, it is important to distinguish 
unfairness from inequality of outcomes. Perceptions of fairness are also shaped 
by the (perceived) degree of equality of opportunity. The chapter argues that fair 
societies exhibit higher levels of well-being and social cohesion which can result in 
more economic efficiency and stronger economic growth.
2. Inequalities, fairness, well-being and economic growth
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INEQUALITIES, 
FAIRNESS, 
WELL-BEING AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH
Fairness is a complex concept which is defined 
and interpreted in different ways by scholars, 
pundits and institutions. Some individuals 
might emphasise the importance of equality of 
outcomes (such as income or wealth) between 
members of society; others, instead, might accept 
greater inequalities of outcomes if they are driven 
by merit and not by circumstances. Fairness-
related perceptions and attitudes are formed 
through individual experiences (Cropanzano et 
al. 2001). People with similar socio-economic 
characteristics, living in the same environment, 
might have different, possibly antipodal fairness 
judgments and perceptions. Ultimately, fairness is 
in the eye of the beholder: a subjective experience 
that depends on the individuals involved and their 
perceptions (Greenberg et al. 1991).
Despite difficulties that arise when defining 
fairness, understanding to what extent Europeans 
perceive their societies and lives as fair and 
what contributes to initiating these feelings is 
relevant. Perceptions of fairness shape individuals’ 
behaviours and decisions and hence have far-
reaching consequences in a variety of social 
contexts (De Cremer and Blader 2006). 
Taking advantage of the JRC-designed 
‘Eurobarometer on Fairness, inequality and 
intergenerational mobility’ (EC 2018e),11  
this chapter first provides insights into Europeans’ 
perceptions of fairness, showing how they 
differ across EU Member States and individual 
characteristics (Section 2.1). The link between 
inequality of outcomes (e.g. income inequality) 
and fairness is investigated and the extent and 
circumstances under which these inequalities 
are considered unfair are discussed (Section 2.2). 
This chapter further explains that perceptions of 
fairness are closely tied to individuals’ well-being 
and well-functioning societies. Individuals living in 
more equal and fairer societies tend to be happier 
and healthier than their counterparts (Section 2.3).  
About half of all 
European adults 
think that life is fair. 
For many Europeans, 
a fair society must 
have living standards 
which are more  
or less equal.
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Finally, Section 2.4 argues that there is not 
necessarily a trade-off between having a fair 
society and economic efficiency. On the contrary, 
societal fairness could contribute to the (economic) 
success of the EU.
 2.1. What do we know about fairness  
 in Europe?
The subjective nature of fairness makes it  
difficult to define and assess it. Nonetheless, 
monitoring the degree to which individuals 
perceive their life and country as fair is valuable  
in order to better understand people’s behaviour 
and attitudes towards certain policies.  
In this context, it is helpful to rely on questions 
directly relating to the beholders’ own definition 
of fairness, as was done in the JRC-designed 
Special Eurobarometer on ‘Fairness, inequality 
and intergenerational mobility’ (EC 2018e). 
Respondents were asked to evaluate whether 
they consider their life as fair by expressing their 
agreement (or disagreement) with the statement: 
‘I believe that most of the things that happen in 
my life are fair’.
On average, about half of European adults either 
strongly agree (11 %) or agree (43  %) with the 
statement that their lives are fair. Nevertheless, 
a sizable share of the respondents (about 22  %) 
either disagree or strongly disagree. As shown 
on the map in Figure 2.1, average perceptions of 
fairness differ widely across EU Member States 
with some macro-regional patterns emerging. In 
Southern European, Eastern European and Baltic 
countries, a rather low share of inhabitants report 
that most of the things happening in their life 
are fair. While there are a few positive exceptions 
(such as Poland and to a lesser extent Estonia and 
Lithuania) in these macro-regions negative opinions 
prevail: only 26 % of Greeks, 36 % of Croatians 
and 39  % of Bulgarians and Cypriots believe that 
their life is fair. Conversely, in the Benelux, Western 
Europe and (especially) in the Nordic countries, 
the corresponding figures are much higher.12 
Particularly positive perceptions are found in 
Ireland (79 %), Denmark (78 %) and Finland (76 %), 
while in France, perceptions of fairness are lower 
than in other Western European countries.
Perceptions of fairness do not only vary across 
countries and macro-regions but also by socio-
economic characteristics (see Figure 2.2).
Individuals with higher education and  
income levels perceive life to be fairer,  
while perceptions of fairness are lower among  
the unemployed and older populations.13
2. Inequalities, fairness, well-being and economic growth
     Fairness 
perceptions 
shape individuals’ 
behaviours and 
decisions and hence 
have far-reaching 
consequences in a variety 
of social contexts.
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Overall, 54 % of Europeans perceive  
life as fair. Going beyond the average, 
a more nuanced picture emerges:  
for low-income earners, individuals  
with comparatively low levels of education  
and older people, the EU does not  
resemble a land of fairness.
 2.2 The link between fairness  
   and inequality
Definitions of fairness often include notions 
of inequality of outcomes, such as inequality 
of incomes. According to the European Social 
Survey, in most of the 17 EU countries surveyed, 
the majority of individuals agree or strongly 
agree that ‘for a fair society differences in 
people’s standard of living should be small’ 
(Figure 2.3). This finding, which in most countries 
has remained quite stable over time, suggests 
that large inequalities in living standards are 
indeed considered unfair by many. 
The agreement rate is not homogeneous across 
EU Member States. In Denmark, a comparatively 
egalitarian country, only 32 % of respondents 
agree with the aforementioned statement. In 
contrast, in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal, the idea 
that fairness requires some equality is particularly 
widespread: more than 80 % of respondents 
2. Inequalities, fairness, well-being and economic growth
Figure 2.1: Perceptions 
of having a fair life  
across Europe 
Notes: Survey weights  
account for socio-demo-
graphic characteristics. 
Individual perceptions  
of fairness are approx-
imated by the rate of 
agreement (agree or 
strongly agree) with the 
statement: ‘I believe that 
most of the things that 
happen in my life are fair’. 
Source: JRC calculations 
based on the Eurobarometer 
on Fairness (EC 2018e). 
    On average,  
about half of 
European adults  
(54 %)  
think that their  
lives are fair.
Share of agreement % 
Under 43
43 − 49
49 − 59
59 − 66
Over 66
Extra-EU
Life is fair
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Figure 2.2: Fairness perceptions by socio-demographic groups 
Notes: Survey weights account for population size and socio-demographic characteristics. Individual perceptions 
of fairness are approximated by the rate of agreement (agree or strongly agree) to the following statement:  
‘I believe that most of the things that happen in my life are fair’. Income details the self-reported income of the 
respondents in quintiles; Gender is a respondent's gender; Education is the highest educational attainment achieved 
by respondents; Employment status is the current employment status, with stud. being students; s.empl. self-employed 
individuals; retired those retired or unable to work; HP house person; and unempl. the unemployed; Urbanisation is 
the subjective degree of urbanisation; and Age divides the respondents into five age cohorts. 
Source: JRC calculations based on the Eurobarometer on Fairness (EC 2018e). 
Figure 2.3: Fair societies: differences in people’s standard of living should be small
Notes: Survey weights account for socio-demographic characteristics. Share of respondents agreeing or strongly 
agreeing with the statement ‘For a fair society, differences in people’s standard of living should be small’  
by country. Calculations are based on the latest ESS data for each country. Depending on availability,  
data is shown for 2008, 2016 or both. 
Source: JRC calculations based on the European Social Survey (ESS).
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believe that fair societies should display only  
small differences in people’s living standards.
Importantly, perceptions of fairness are linked to 
equality of outcomes (e.g. income inequality), as 
illustrated in Figure 2.4. The share of respondents 
per country agreeing that most of the things 
happening in their life are fair is plotted against: 
(a) a measure of income inequality (the ratio 
between the incomes at the 90th and 10th 
percentile of the income distribution); and (b) 
individuals’ perceptions that ‘differences in 
people’s income are too great’. Perceptions of 
fairness are on average higher in countries with 
lower levels of income inequality (Figure 2.4, 
panel a). In a similar vein, fairness perceptions are 
on average more positive in countries where the 
perception that income differences are excessive is 
lower (Figure 2.4, panel b).
At the individual level, fairness perceptions 
correlate more strongly with people’s beliefs about 
income inequality than with its factual extent. 
This is because individual judgements about 
fairness are filtered through the dense fabric of 
individual perceptions, preferences, values and 
beliefs. People tend to misperceive inequalities 
(see Box 2.1), and differ significantly in terms of 
the level of inequality they consider tolerable. 
Individuals also care about the process leading to 
inequalities of outcomes and hold different values 
regarding their justifications. Hence, inequalities of 
outcomes are not considered unfair to the same 
degree by everyone. 
Inequality of outcomes can result from individual 
choices, such as variations in effort, from circum-
stances, such as gender, family socio-economic 
background or ethnicity, or simply from luck.  
2. Inequalities, fairness, well-being and economic growth
Figure 2.4: Fairness perceptions and actual income inequality
a. Fairness perceptions and actual income differences 
Notes: x-axis: ‘I believe that most of the things that 
happen in my life are fair’ % agreement (agree and 
strongly agree)*; y-axis, ‘Ratio 90-10’ is the ratio between 
incomes at the 90th and 10th percentile, comparing the 
highest to the lowest incomes. The higher this ratio is, 
the higher the level of income inequality. 
Source: x-axis: as in Figure 24b. y-axis: EU Statistics on Income 
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC, 2014), the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS 2014), and the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (SOEP 2014).
b. Perceptions of fairness and acceptance  
of income differences 
Notes: x-axis: ‘I believe that most of the things 
that happen in my life are fair’ % agreement 
(agree and strongly agree)*; y-axis, ‘Nowadays, 
differences in people’s incomes are too great’  
% agreement (agree and strongly agree)*.
Source: JRC calculations based on the Eurobarometer  
on Fairness (EC 2018e). 
*Survey weights account for socio-demographic characteristics.
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Several studies show that individuals accept,  
at least to a certain extent, unequal outcomes 
when they arise from different levels of individual 
effort and merit (e.g. Savani and Rattan 2012; 
Almås et al. 2010; Cappelen et al. 2016).14 
Conversely, people resist inequalities when  
they believe that individuals do not share  
equal opportunities which ‘level the playing  
field’ so that all have the potential to achieve  
the same outcomes (Roemer 2008). 
While the distribution of outcomes (such as 
income) is a central piece of the puzzle  
in understanding Europeans’ perceptions  
of fairness, it is important to distinguish  
inequality from unfairness (Starmans et al. 2017).  
Inequalities of outcomes driven by merit  
rather than circumstances which are beyond  
an individual’s control are not necessarily 
considered unfair (see Box 2.2). 
 
 2.3 Fairness and well-being
Inequality of outcomes is tied to subjective 
well-being – ‘a person’s cognitive and affective 
evaluations of his or her life’ (Diener et al. 2003, 
p. 63).15 Research shows that among EU Member 
States higher levels of income and wealth 
inequality correspond to lower individual levels  
of life satisfaction and happiness (Clark et al. 
2006; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Ramos 2014; 
Ngamaba et al. 2018; Schwarze and Härpfer 
2007; Senik 2008) and that this effect is  
stronger for low-income earners (Alesina  
et al. 2004). Income inequality is not only  
inversely linked to subjective well-being but  
also to physical and mental health. In more 
unequal countries, mental health problems  
and other health issues (e.g. obesity) among  
adults and children are more prevalent  
(Wilkinson and Pickett 2009b; 2019). 
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Empirical evidence suggests that people on 
average misperceive the actual level of income 
inequality in their countries as well as its variation 
over time (Gimpelson and Treisman 2018; Hauser 
and Norton 2017). However, there are sizeable 
cross-country differences regarding the direction 
and magnitude of such misperceptions.
In the United States and the United Kingdom, 
underestimation of income and wealth inequality 
is relatively common (Hauser and Norton 2017; 
Norton and Ariely 2011), although its degree is 
disputed (Eriksson and Simpson 2012). Norton and 
Ariely (2011) find that US citizens underestimate 
the share of wealth held by the wealthiest quintile 
(84 %) by more than 25 percentage points (pp). 
Similarly, Osberg and Smeeding (2006) show how 
box 2.1  (Mis)perceptions of inequality
Americans believe earning disparities between 
different occupations to be much lower than  
they actually are.
Conversely, overestimation of income inequality 
occurs in most continental European countries 
(Hauser and Norton 2017). Even in countries  
with very similar income distributions, opinions 
about the shape of the income distribution differ 
widely. Around 50 % of Germans believe that  
the majority of the German population lives  
at the bottom of society. In France, 70 % of  
the respondents think the same about the French 
population. A similar figure is observed in Eastern 
European countries where overestimation of 
inequality is quite common and strong, even  
in relatively equal societies (Niehues 2014).
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There are several possible mechanisms that can 
explain why members of unequal societies might 
suffer. First, individuals prefer equality and fair 
processes (see Box 2.2) and unmet preferences 
generate tension and discontent. Second, inequality 
can convey information about future labour market 
options, creating insecure economic prospects. 
Third, striving for social status is an often observed 
human behaviour. Social status comparisons and 
competition are thus potentially more important 
in more unequal societies. Such comparisons can 
cause stress, anxiety and adversely affect well-being 
(Wilkinson and Pickett 2019).
2. Inequalities, fairness, well-being and economic growth
Much of the current knowledge on how people relate 
to unequal distributions comes from experimental 
studies. In the social sciences, inequity aversion has 
been studied mainly through behavioural games. 
Findings suggest that ‘[…] people resist inequitable 
outcomes; i.e. they are willing to give up some 
material payoff to move in the direction of more 
equitable outcomes’ (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, p. 
819). Neuroscience studies use functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) to test for the existence of 
inequity aversion reactions in the brain. Tricomi et 
al. (2010) find that the human brain shows similar 
physiological reactions both to being a beneficiary 
and to being a victim of an unequal split. 
Aversion towards the unequal distribution of 
outcomes tells only one part of the story. Studies 
also draw attention to the importance of the 
process through which inequalities of outcomes are 
generated. When there is evidence of an unequal 
contribution to a surplus, most people choose to 
divide the surplus so as to reflect individual effort 
and merit. Indeed, people are willing to restrain 
their own selfish interest to make sure that effort is 
rewarded – although to different degrees, suggesting 
that there are heterogeneous preferences guiding 
these choices (Ruffle 1998; Cappelen et al. 2007).
box 2.2  Experimental research into inequity aversion
Research further shows that the readiness to 
accept merit-based distributions is a cultural, 
learned behaviour that develops gradually 
with age. Around eight years old, most children 
show strong preferences for egalitarianism and 
avoid both advantageous and disadvantageous 
allocations, no matter what the individual 
contributions are (Fehr et al. 2008; Fehr et al. 
2013). As children grow older, they gradually 
learn to accept inequalities, and by adolescence, 
only a minority would opt for a fully equal 
distribution of rewards when achievements  
vary (Almås et al. 2010) – a pattern similar  
to adults’ perceptions of fairness.
Other individual characteristics besides age also 
influence the fairness perceptions of individuals. 
At the age of 15, students of low socio-economic 
status still prefer more equal distributions 
even when original contributions are unequal. 
In contrast, in such cases, high socio-economic 
status students are more likely to take merit into 
account and redistribute money in a way that 
reflects this difference. Furthermore, compared 
to boys, girls tend to be more likely to follow 
egalitarian views of fairness (for a review see 
Sutter et al. 2019).
    Inequality  
of outcomes  
is tied to subjective  
well-being.
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In addition, economic inequalities are associated 
with a range of social dysfunctions (e.g. violent 
crime, homicide and school dropout), hampering 
the correct functioning of society (Wilkinson and 
Pickett 2009a). Income inequality is a significant 
determinant of mistrust, which in turn (negatively) 
affects civic engagement (Uslaner and Brown 
2005; d’Hombres et al. 2013) as well as local and 
national social cohesion (Elgar 2010; Rothstein 
and Uslaner 2005). Laboratory studies show that 
individuals display less overall cooperation and 
interconnectedness when inequalities are made 
salient (Nishi et al. 2015). While these issues 
appear to be worse for individuals on lower levels 
of the social hierarchy, their impacts are not 
limited to low-income earners but tend to affect 
the whole of society (Wilkinson and Pickett 2019).
Following the argument in Section 2.2 on fairness 
and inequality, it is important to acknowledge 
that there is more to fairness than inequality of 
outcomes. Indeed, it is not only inequality per 
se, but also its perception and underlying drivers 
that matter. Even large income inequalities might 
at times be acceptable and do not negatively 
affect happiness when individuals think they 
are generated through a fair and legitimate 
process. Conversely, very small inequalities can 
lead to discontent and unhappiness if they seem 
unjustified (Oishi et al. 2011; Schneider 2012). 
Americans, for instance, are less opposed to 
inequalities than Europeans, mainly because more 
commonly they share the (mis)belief of living in 
a mobile society, whereby moving up the social 
ladder is a matter of individual effort. In fact, 
social mobility is lower in the USA than in most  
of the EU Member States (Alesina et al. 2004; 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Ramos 2014; Ngamaba  
et al. 2018; D'Ambrosio and Clark 2018).16
Figure 2.5 links self-reported happiness directly 
with individual perceptions of fairness. It shows 
that the more people in a country agree with the 
statement ‘most of the things that happen in my 
life are fair’, the higher the share of people who 
consider themselves happy. Northern and Western 
EU Member States show higher levels of fairness 
perceptions and happiness while levels in Southern 
and Eastern European countries are lower. 
The relationship between perceptions of fairness 
and happiness in Europe is also the subject of a 
JRC study (Dessart and Marandola 2019). The 
authors make a distinction between the individual 
perception of fairness in the respondent’s life and 
2. Inequalities, fairness, well-being and economic growth
Figure 2.5:  
Fairness perceptions  
and happiness
Notes: x-axis: ‘I believe 
that most of the things 
that happen in my life 
are fair’, % agreement 
(agree and strongly agree); 
y-axis, ‘In general, I 
consider myself a happy 
person’ % agreement 
(agree and strongly agree). 
Survey weights account 
for socio-demographic 
characteristics.
Source: JRC calculations 
based on the Eurobarometer 
on Fairness (EC 2018e).
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in the country at large. Happiness is positively 
linked to both fairness perception measures, 
although the correlation is stronger with the former 
than with the latter measure.17 These conclusions 
hold after taking into account individual socio-
economic characteristics and country specificities 
and confirm that although happiness is related to 
many aspects of life, perceptions of fairness are 
certainly among them.
 2.4 Fairness, efficiency  
  and competitiveness
There is a long-standing debate in economics on the 
potential trade-off between equality and efficiency. 
For many years, the prevailing consensus was 
that inequality-reducing interventions have large 
efficiency costs: unconstrained economies would 
improve everybody’s position whereas government 
redistribution financed through taxation would distort 
incentives and reduce labour supply and investment 
(e.g. Okun 1975).18 This argument is increasingly being 
challenged and there is now substantial evidence 
which indicates that in several economic domains, 
equality (i.e. less inequality) and efficiency are 
complementary rather than conflictual (see Box 2.3).19
An increasing number of scholars are converging 
towards the view that income inequality hampers 
economic growth (e.g. Cingano 2014; Dabla-Norris 
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There are different channels through which 
government intervention can help reduce 
inequality while fostering efficiency. For example, 
when individuals do not only care about their own 
income but compare themselves to their peer 
groups, income taxation and redistribution can 
increase efficiency while simultaneously reducing 
inequality (Corneo 2002). Similarly, if low-wage 
and high-wage workers differ in their motivation,  
a progressive tax schedule reduces the distortion 
of taxation (Røed and Strøm 2002).
Progressive income taxation can also function 
as an insurance mechanism for entrepreneurs, 
allowing for more risk-taking, thereby inducing 
entrepreneurial activity and associated economic 
box 2.3 Government interventions, equality and efficiency
expansion (Cullen and Gordon 2007).  
A similar argument about risk sharing between  
the individual and society (or the government) 
can be extended to the welfare state’s tax-benefit 
system. While insurance mechanisms against 
unemployment risk in the form of unemployment 
benefits might create negative incentives,  
They also allow individuals to take the risky  
decision of developing their talents as opposed  
to choosing more secure employment 
opportunities such as those provided by parental 
occupations. In fact, in countries with less-
developed welfare states, sons more often choose 
the occupation of their father than is the case 
in countries with higher levels of unemployment 
benefits (Corneo 2013).
    In several 
economic domains 
equality and 
efficiency are 
complementary rather 
than conflicting.
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et al. 2015; Brueckner and Ledermann 2015; 
Kennedy et al. 2017; Berg et al. 2018; Gründler  
and Scheuermeyer 2018). This has not always  
been the case (Li and Zou 1998; Forbes 2000; 
Barro 2000) and the shift in the findings seems 
to be mainly driven by the growing importance 
of human capital (i.e. education) in supporting 
economic growth (Milanovic 2011; Galor  
and Moav 2004).
Historically, physical capital (i.e. investments) was 
the biggest constraint to economic development. 
Given that rich people have a higher rate of saving, 
a more unequal income distribution resulted in 
higher savings and more investments. Today, 
human capital holds the key to economic growth 
(Milanovic 2011). More equal societies offer more 
equal education opportunities and achieve better 
education outcomes and other things equal, tend 
to grow more as well (see the meta-analyses 
by De Dominicis et al. 2008; Neves et al. 2016). 
According to Aiyar and Ebeke (2019), the adverse 
effect of income inequality on economic growth 
is particularly strong when intergenerational 
rigidities (i.e. when social status is passed on 
across generations) are present.20
The negative association between inequality and 
growth for the EU also seems to be confirmed at 
the sub-national level (Ezcurra 2007; Ezcurra 2009; 
Royuela et al. 2019).21 The idea that social justice, 
fairness and relative equality can be important 
drivers of competitiveness, especially at the regional 
and city level, is further emphasised in the literature 
on cohesion (e.g. Ache et al. 2008; Pastor 2006). 
More equal and fairer societies exhibit higher  
levels of life-satisfaction, happiness and,  
more broadly, improved social outcomes.  
This can be achieved without necessarily  
incurring efficiency costs. 
 2.5 Concluding remarks
Fair societies are likely to be more efficient and 
display higher economic growth rates than unfair 
ones. Fairness is linked to higher levels of well-
being and greater social cohesion. However, data 
suggest that on average Europeans are not fully 
satisfied with the extent of fairness in their lives. 
While about half of Europeans believe that their 
life is fair, going beyond this average shows 
surprisingly great disparities. Perceptions differ 
markedly across countries and socio-demographic 
groups, with comparatively low levels of fairness 
perception in some groups. 
What then constitutes a fair society and 
what can be done to improve the situation? 
To answer these questions, it is important to 
understand where the perceptions of fairness 
originate. Individual perceptions of fairness are 
associated with equality. However, equality of 
outcomes and equality of opportunities have to 
be distinguished. Some degree of inequality of 
outcomes might be considered fair as long as  
it is justified by effort and merit. 
Of course, fairness judgments are not mere 
derivatives of the levels of inequality of outcomes 
and opportunities. Instead, they are complex 
reflections of the reality as filtered through 
individual experiences, environmental conditions, 
2. Inequalities, fairness, well-being and economic growth
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values and preferences. People have different ideas 
on the degree to which inequalities are acceptable 
and if certain difficulties can or cannot be overcome 
by effort. However, measures taken to mitigate 
inequality of outcomes and to minimise inequality 
of opportunities will not only make Europe a fairer 
society but will also improve people’s well-being, 
promote the healthy functioning of society  
and boost economic growth.
In the following chapters, this report provides 
evidence to help better understand where the EU 
stands with regard to two crucial dimensions of 
many fairness conceptions: equality of outcomes 
and equality of opportunities. Chapter 3 addresses 
income inequalities – as one form of inequality  
of outcomes. Chapter 4 then provides evidence  
on inequality of opportunities as approximated  
by intergenerational mobility.
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SUMMARY
This chapter examines EU-wide income inequality between 2006 and 2016. It high-
lights income inequality dynamics over the entire EU-wide income distribution and 
for different income components. Special attention is given to heterogeneities across 
macro-regions. Since 2006, the EU-wide labour income inequality has been high but 
quite stable whilst inequality in household income has declined. Inequality in South-
ern Europe has increased significantly since 2006, particularly in the bottom half of 
the income distribution. Income inequality in this region was lower in 2006 than EU-
wide inequality, but by 2013 it had reached the EU-wide level. In Central and Eastern 
Europe, average incomes increased between 2007 and 2016 while income inequality 
followed a declining trend. In contrast, income inequality in North-Western Europe 
remained relatively low and stable with the burden of the economic downturn being 
distributed more proportionally among all income groups. These dynamics resulted 
in a convergence of income levels and a reduction in EU-wide income inequality.
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The EU witnessed many significant events 
during the 2000s: among others, the euro was 
introduced, the number of Member States almost 
doubled, a deep economic and financial crisis 
struck and, more recently, the EU experienced a 
wave of migration. At the same time, globalisation 
continued apace, while digitalisation and 
technological innovations have fundamentally 
altered the structure of European economies.
The economic and financial crisis – also known 
as the Great Recession – began in 2008 and 
resulted in an unprecedented loss of income in 
EU Member States and many other countries. 
This loss of income was not only substantial in 
size, but also highly unevenly distributed. This 
had direct implications for people’s daily lives, 
their perception of society as a whole and their 
expectations about the future. Beyond a certain 
level, inequality is considered socially corrosive 
and harmful for the economy. In addition, 
inequality in economic resources creates a 
situation of inequality of opportunity for the 
younger generation.
This chapter aims to enhance the understanding of 
income inequality in the EU. To this end, EU-wide 
income inequality over the period 2006-2016 is 
examined and stylised facts provided on inequality 
changes across the entire income distribution and 
for different income sources in the EU as a whole 
as well as for three EU macro-regions. Analysis 
of the dynamics of the entire income distribution 
highlights where inequality originates, where 
incomes increased or decreased, and whether such 
changes were inclusive or unbalanced. This detailed 
picture helps to understand the role of families 
and welfare systems as insurance mechanisms 
against income shocks. Globalisation, and in 
particular the rise of trade pressure from China, 
and technological innovation are often presented 
as drivers of income inequality. Available evidence 
on those drivers will be briefly discussed. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as 
follows: Section 3.1 describes income inequality 
dynamics in a global context. Section 3.2 provides a 
detailed analysis of the EU-wide income distribution. 
Section 3.3 discusses some of the drivers of income 
inequality with a particular focus on technological 
change, institutional change and globalisation.  
INCOME 
INEQUALITY 
IN EUROPE
The increase in 
income inequality 
across Southern  
Europe has been 
driven by declining 
incomes among 
the poor. 
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The evidence is largely drawn from several recent 
JRC studies (Benczúr et al. 2017; Cseres-Gergely 
and Kvedaras 2019, 2020; De Palo et al. 2018a, 
2018b). Section 3.4 concludes this chapter.
 3.1 Long-term global trends  
   in income inequality 
In order to relate and contextualise the income 
distribution in Europe, it is useful to consider the 
development of income inequality over the long 
term and for different entities (i.e. global and world 
regions). Observing the share of income accrued 
to the richest 10 % of the population from 1980, 
there is a growing trend in income concentration 
in Asia, North America and the EU (Figure 3.1). In 
sub-Saharan Africa, the region with the highest 
level of income concentration in 1980, a slightly 
declining trend can be observed. Global income 
inequality was at its highest level between 2000 
and 2005 and fell thereafter. The EU experienced 
some increase in income inequality until 2008 but 
has seen little change since then. Overall, income 
concentration in the EU is considerably lower 
than in any other world regions. Declining income 
inequality on a global scale is mainly driven by 
rising incomes for large shares of the Chinese and 
Indian populations (Milanovic 2016).22
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 3.2 EU-wide income distribution  
   at different levels of aggregation
The official measure of overall EU income 
inequality aggregates Member-State-level 
indicators. In this section, an alternative approach 
is taken. EU-wide income inequality is calculated 
Figure 3.1: Income inequality globally and in world regions between 1980 and 2016 
Notes: Income inequality is measured by the share of income accruing to the richest 10 %.  
Source: WID: https://wid.world/world
   The EU 
experienced  
some increase  
in income inequality 
until 2008  
and has seen little 
change since.
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directly from the incomes of all EU citizens (see 
Box 3.1 for methodological details). Such an EU-
wide approach has some advantages: the growing 
importance of the social dimension of the EU 
requires an understanding of the pan-European 
social situation, including on income inequality. 
Also, the integration of the EU into world trade 
and the increasingly integrated internal markets 
both require thinking about Europe as a common 
market for goods, labour, and income, too. More 
generally, analysing EU-wide income inequality 
provides some insights which complement the 
official EU income inequality measures (Brandolini 
2007; Benczúr et al. 2017; Vacas-Soriano et al. 
2017; Filauro 2017).23
Figure 3.2 visualises EU income inequality, 
measured by the Gini coefficient, over the period 
2006-2016. The continuous purple line, which 
depicts EU-27-wide inequality24, is well above 
the purple dashed line, the official population-
weighted country average from Eurostat.  
The latter almost coincides with the EU-15-wide 
indicator (blue line), calculated for all individuals 
in the EU-15. While the EU-27-wide income 
distribution has become slightly more equal  
over time, an increase in concentration  
can be observed for the EU-15-wide  
income distribution.
Given the differences in living standards across 
EU Member States, comparing the incomes of all 
Europeans results unsurprisingly in higher levels 
of income inequality when compared to the official 
approach whereby only individuals within each 
EU Member State are compared and national 
concentration measures are then averaged  
across Member States. 
EU-wide income inequality is based on data 
from the EU-SILC survey. Microdata from EU Member 
States were appended, corrected, harmonised 
and weighted to yield an EU-wide database of 
individuals that can be aggregated in various 
ways. A modified Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) scale is used 
to calculate per-capita equivalised income levels, 
and Eurostat’s purchasing parity index is used 
to express them in a common purchasing parity 
standard (PPS). All calculations are based on a 
sub-sample of the working 25 to 64-year-olds for 
the years 2006-2016. This data is used to calculate 
inequality measures for the whole EU and three 
macro-areas: North-Western Europe (NW): Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK; 
Southern Europe (SE): Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal and Spain; and Central and Eastern Europe 
(CCE): Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
box 3.1 Data and indicators for EU-wide income distribution
Several measures are used in this chapter  
to characterise income distribution.  
The Gini coefficient ranges from zero to one.  
A Gini coefficient of one indicates maximum 
income inequality, when all incomes accrue  
to a single individual; the value zero implies  
the minimum level of inequality, when  
the incomes of all individuals are identical. 
Percentile ratios show the ratio of income  
levels at two chosen points of income 
distribution. For example, the ratio between 
incomes at the top of the distribution  
(the 90th percentile) and at the middle  
(the 50th percentile) – abbreviated as the 
p90-p50 ratio – are discussed. The p90-p10 
ratio, which is the ratio of incomes at the top 
of the distribution (the 90th percentile) and at 
the bottom (the 10th percentile) is an alternative 
percentile ratio. Lastly, income concentration  
can be captured by the share of income accrued 
to a specific group, e.g. the richest 10 %.
3. Income inequality in Europe
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  3.2.1 Income inequality in three  
   geographical areas of the EU
As the difference between the official statistics  
and the EU-wide measure is driven by  
the difference in average incomes across EU 
Member States, it is interesting to take a closer 
look at the income differences across three macro-
regions (North-Western, Southern, and Central and 
Eastern Europe) within which Member States have 
relatively similar average incomes (see Box 3.1). 
Figure 3.3 highlights the geographical differences: 
in 2016, the average annual net household income 
in North-Western Europe was at least EUR 5 000 
higher than in Southern Europe. In Southern 
Europe, incomes were at least EUR 5 000 higher 
than in the Central and Eastern countries of the EU. 
The geographical differences relate not only  
to income levels but also to income inequality.  
Figure 3.4 depicts the level of income inequality  
in the EU and its macro-regions.  
 
A comparison of Figures 3.3 and 3.4 shows that 
on the level of macro-regions income inequality 
and income levels have an inverse relationship: 
income inequality is highest in the poorest 
geographical area, Central and Eastern Europe, 
and is lowest in the richest geographical area, the 
North-West. Furthermore, the declining income 
level in Southern Europe between 2007 and 2013 
(Figure 3.3) was associated with an increase in 
income inequality, and vice versa (Figure 3.4). 
In contrast, a positive trend in income growth in 
Central and Eastern Europe was accompanied by 
a negative trend in income inequality. No clear 
trend is observed for the North-West. EU-wide 
income inequality fell, obviously hiding substantial 
heterogeneities across EU macro-regions.
Box 3.2 goes beyond the analysis of income  
and discusses the distribution of consumption, 
lifetime income and wealth.
Figure 3.2: Inequality of household net equivalised 
per capita income in the EU, 2006-2016 
Notes: Unit of observation is the household with 
at least one person aged 25-60 years old; equivalised 
household incomes (OECD scale) in PPS at 2015 prices.   
Source: JRC calculations based on EU-SILC data for  
the EU-15-wide and EU-wide. The series EU - Eurostat  
is an extract from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat. Inequality  
of household net equivalised per capita income is measured  
with the Gini coefficient. No data is available for Croatia.
The inequality of income is not the only  
relevant measure when considering inequalities.  
It is also instructive to look one step ‘before’  
and ‘after’ the generation of income and  
analyse the distribution of wealth (which is  
related to accumulated income) and consumption 
(which captures current standards of living  
more directly). A systematic analysis of 
consumption and wealth is made possible  
by the recent Eurosystem’s Household Finance  
and Consumption Survey initiative which  
focuses mainly on the euro area.
As shown in the Figure in this box,  
the concentration of wealth is much higher  
than that of income or consumption. This is  
not surprising since wealth accumulation is  
the outcome of a long process of lifetime  
savings and inheritance. Furthermore,  
wealth itself creates income.
box 3.2 The inequality of wealth, income 
   and consumption
3. Income inequality in Europe
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
EU-15-wide
EU - Eurostat
EU-wide
0.26
0.28
0.30
0.32
0.34
0.36
0.38
G
in
i c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
35
Figure 3.3: Net household income levels in  
the EU and by macro-region, 2006-2016
Figure 3.4: Inequality in net household income in 
the EU and by macro-region, 2006-2016
Notes: North-Western EU (NW): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, LU, NL, SE, UK; Southern EU (SE): CY, EL, IT, 
MT, PT, ES; Central and Eastern EU (CEE): BG, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, PL, RO, SK, SL. Unit of observation  
is the household with at least one person aged 25-60 years old; equivalised household incomes (OECD scale),  
in PPS at 2015 prices. 
Source: JRC calculations based on EU-SILC data.
box 3.2 The inequality of wealth, income 
   and consumption
At the same time, income inequality over 
individuals’ entire life cycle is smaller than  
the inequality of annual income. The difference  
is mainly caused by transitory income effects. 
These are related to life-cycle events or random 
shocks, e.g. low earnings during education,  
bonus payments, or transitory employment 
shocks. These fluctuations tend to be smoothed 
out over the years. Since households can save  
and borrow to dampen the impact of transitory 
income fluctuations, inequality in living standards 
depends primarily on the distribution of lifetime 
income rather than annual income.
Due to data limitations, little is known about 
the patterns of lifetime inequality. Exploiting 
administrative (social security) data, Bönke  
et al. (2015) find that German lifetime earnings 
inequality is about two-thirds of annual earnings 
inequality. Haan et al. (2018) further confirm  
Figure: Median levels of consumption, income  
and wealth by wealth quintile in the euro area  
Source: Household Finance and Consumption Network (2016). 
that annual inequality measures provide an 
incomplete picture of people’s living standards. 
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  3.2.2 Income inequality at the bottom  
   and top of the distribution
The Gini coefficient is one of the most commonly 
used measures of income inequality. However,  
this single indicator does not capture all the 
important characteristics of income distribution. 
In particular, the Gini coefficient might obscure 
different developments happening at the bottom, 
middle or top of the income distribution (Benczúr 
et al. 2017). For this reason, the analysis is 
complemented with a separate analysis of 
the p50-p10 and p90-p50 percentile ratios 
(see Box 3.1), two alternative indicators which are 
sensitive to changes in the incomes of the poor 
and the rich relative to the income of the median 
earner. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 display the evolution 
of income inequality in the lower half (p50-p10 
ratio) and upper half (p90-p50 ratio) of the income 
distribution, respectively. This more detailed look 
reveals that the variation in overall inequality in 
Southern Europe, as indicated by the Gini coefficient 
in Figure 3.4, is mainly due to an increase in  
the income gap between the median earner and 
the poor and can be only marginally attributed 
to changes in the upper half of the income 
distribution. It is further noteworthy that income 
inequality is more pronounced in the lower half of 
the income distribution than in the upper half.25
  3.2.3 The role of different income concepts 
    in shaping inequality
Household income is compiled from multiple 
income sources from different household 
members. The diversification of income sources 
allows for some kind of insurance mechanism 
for individuals against excessive income loss 
at the household level. If income sources are 
not positively correlated, each one can serve as 
potential insurance against the variability of the 
others (Blundell 2011). This section discerns how 
the bundling of income sources and earners, 
resulting in different income concepts, has shaped 
income inequality during and after the financial 
and economic crisis.
Figure 3.5: Income inequality in the bottom half of 
the annual gross labour income distribution (p50-p10 
ratio), EU and macro-regions, 2006-2016
Notes: North-Western EU (NW): AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, LU, NL, SE, UK; Southern EU (SE): CY, EL, IT, 
MT, PT, ES; Central and Eastern EU (CEE): BG, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, PL, RO, SK, SL. Unit of observation  
is the individual; sample of all 25-60-year-olds with non-zero work-related income, in PPS at 2015 prices.
Source: JRC calculations based on EU-SILC data.
Figure 3.6: Income inequality in the top half of the 
annual gross labour income distribution (p90-p50 
ratio), EU and macro-regions, 2006-2016
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Figure 3.7 presents the p50-p10 percentile ratios 
for Southern Europe and the EU as a whole  
for various income categories, concepts, such as 
labour income, personal income (also including 
returns on capital), income of couples, and gross 
and net household income. Household income 
is especially important as it provides the best 
indication of the resources actually available  
to the household for the family.
Figure 3.7 indicates that in the lower half of 
the income distribution there are differences 
in both the level and the dynamics of different 
income concepts: income inequality is lower and 
less volatile as government benefits and other 
sources of income are added to labour income. 
Within society, not only government redistribution 
but also household composition influence  
the concentration of household incomes. Thus, 
future changes in household composition, e.g. 
an increase in single-headed households, might 
limit intra-family insurance mechanisms against 
income shocks.
Note the dynamics and extent of income 
inequality for different income categories in 
Southern Europe. Before the Great Recession,  
the inequality of labour incomes for the poorer 
half of the population was lower in Southern 
Europe than in the EU as a whole. By 2013, 
labour incomes in Southern Europe were more 
unequally distributed than in the EU as a whole, 
with inequality peaking in 2014 and then declining 
(purple dashed lines in Figure 3.7). The inequality 
of net household incomes in Southern Europe  
has a slightly increasing trend until 2013.  
Data for the two geographical areas (North-West  
and Central and Eastern Europe) do not show  
similar dynamics (Benczúr et al. 2017). 
  3.2.4 Gains, losses and convergence  
    of income distributions in  
    the EU-wide distribution
This section analyses income gains and losses  
by income group for the two time points 2007  
and 2014 (Cseres-Gergely and Kvedaras 2019).  
Figure 3.7: Income inequality in the bottom half (p50-p10 percentile ratio) of the distribution of different 
income concepts: EU (left panel) and Southern EU (right panel) 
Notes: Southern EU: CY, EL, IT, MT, PT, ES. Sample: 25-60-year-olds with non-zero income of the specific 
type in PPS at 2015 prices. Income categories are: Labour - labour income; Personal - labour income plus person-
specific government benefits; Couple - shared couple’s income (including personal and benefits); Household gross 
- equivalised household income (including all household-level incomes, such as asset income and household-
related transfers); Household net - equivalised per capita overall household income net (i.e. after tax).  
Source: Benczúr et al. 2017, based on EU-SILC data.
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Figure 3.8 depicts the income centiles at the 
EU level and by macro-region. The centiles are 
income levels separating a given share of the 
population from the rest. For example, the centile 
for the 40th percentile of the EU-wide distribution 
(blue line) totals about EUR 15 000 in 2007. This 
means 40 % of the EU population had an annual 
income of less than EUR 15 000.
A comparison of incomes for the different 
macro-regions allows the relative income 
positions of individuals to be compared. An 
individual situated in the 80th percentile of the 
EU distribution, i.e. among the richest 20 % 
of all Europeans, is among the 1 % of richest 
individuals (the 100 percentile) in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Similarly, for an individual from 
North-Western Europe to belong to the 20 % 
of richest individuals in the whole of Europe, it 
suffices that he/she must be among the 40 % 
of richest individuals in his/her region. Given 
the information in Figure 3.8, in general it 
seems true that individuals from North-Western 
Europe always have a relatively better position 
when compared to the whole of Europe while 
individuals from Central and Eastern Europe 
always have a relatively worse position. 
This sensitivity about an individual’s position 
relative to the reference group provides 
interesting insights into individual mobility 
decisions across the EU. Central and Eastern 
European citizens moving to the North-West  
of the EU are compensated by higher earnings. 
This increase in income has to compensate 
for the economic and non-economic costs of 
migration, including the potentially lower prestige 
of their new positions. In Southern Europe, in 2007, 
relative positions were more or less the same as 
in the EU-wide income distribution (see the almost 
coinciding red and blue lines in Figure 3.8).
Further insights and understanding about income 
dynamics across the EU can be obtained when 
analysing the changes in income levels. Figure 3.9 
depicts the percentage growth rate of incomes for 
each income decile for the EU-wide distribution 
and the three macro-regions. As indicated by the 
solid blue line, income levels between 2007 and 
2014 slightly improved for the poorest 18 % of 
Figure 3.8: Income by population percentile in the EU and by macro-regions, 2007 
Notes: North-Western EU: AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, LU, NL, SE, UK; Southern EU: CY, EL, IT, MT, PT, 
ES; Central and Eastern EU: BG, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, PL, RO, SK, SL. Unit of observation is the individual; 
sample of all 25-60-year-olds, incomes in PPS at 2015 prices.  
Source: JRC calculations based on EU-SILC data.
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individuals in the EU, but worsened for all other 
individuals. This suggests a convergence of income 
levels within the EU as a whole and a decline in 
overall income inequality. At first sight, this finding 
contradicts the general view that poor people were 
hit disproportionately by the shocks experienced 
by the EU over the past decade. 
However, this EU-wide convergence does not 
necessarily imply that the same change took 
place in all geographic regions. The orange line 
in Figure 3.9 indicates that, in North-Western 
Europe, the reduction in incomes due to the 
Great Recession were shared quite equally by 
individuals from all income levels. On the contrary, 
in Southern Europe, the poor were hit much harder 
than better-off individuals. In Central and Eastern 
Europe, incomes increased for almost everyone 
between 2007 and 2014. Developments in Central 
and Eastern Europe also explain the improving 
income levels of the poorest 18 % across the 
EU. The vast majority of individuals among the 
poorest 18 % of the EU population live in Central 
and Eastern Europe, where even poor people 
enjoyed some increases in their income. 
Figure 3.9: Income variation between 2014 and 2007 in the EU and by macro-region 
Notes: North-Western EU: AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, IE, LU, NL, SE, UK; Southern EU: CY, EL, IT, MT, PT, 
ES; Central and Eastern EU: BG, CZ, EE, HU, LV, LT, PL, RO, SK, SL. Unit of observation is the individual; 
sample of all 25-60-year-olds, incomes in PPS at 2015 prices.  
Source: JRC calculations based on EU-SILC data.
There is a growing consensus that too high 
levels of income inequality are likely to 
create economic and social costs to society 
(e.g. Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Data from 
the Special Eurobarometer on Fairness (EC 
2018e) reveal that the majority of Europeans 
favour a more equitable distribution of 
incomes. A JRC study (Colagrossi et al. 
2019b) investigates the link between income 
inequality and support for redistribution. The 
results of the study show that 82 % of the 
respondents agree that their governments 
should take measures to reduce income 
inequality. Public demand for government 
action is proportionate to the actual level 
of income equality in a country. Specifically, 
the greater the p90-p10 ratio, the higher the 
support for redistributive policies.
box 3.3 Income inequality and support  
   for redistribution across Europe
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 3.3 Drivers of income inequality
There are many factors influencing income 
inequality. The most fundamental, also raising 
particular interest among academics and 
policymakers, are technological change (e.g. 
Acemoglu 2002), changes in product and labour 
market regulations (e.g. Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa 
2005), and globalisation (e.g. Milanovic 2016).
  3.3.1 Technological change
Technological change and the availability of novel 
technologies, in particular in the information and 
communication technology sector (ICT), have 
led to important productivity gains which, in 
principle, could be shared by the entire population 
and make societies more equitable. However, 
on the employment side, technological change 
has had adverse effects on income distribution 
by increasing the demand for highly qualified 
workers, which favoured both a skill premium and 
a lowering of the wages for middle-skilled workers 
(Michaels et al. 2014).26 Similarly, studies based 
on US data (Autor et al. 1998, 2008; Autor and 
Katz 1999) report that the effect of skill-biased 
technological change on relative skill demands 
led to greater wage inequality in the 1980s and 
1990s, accompanied by large increases in wage 
differentials by skill group. In most EU countries, 
the proportion of middle-skilled jobs also declined 
(Goos et al. 2009, 2014; Peugny 2019; Fernandez-
Macias 2012). More specifically, the expansion 
of the ICT sector over time (1993-2007) led to 
a lower share of employment in middle-wage 
occupations while, on the contrary, the share of 
employment in high-wage occupations in industries 
depending on ICT increased (Jerbashian 2019). 
According to a recent JRC study (De Palo et 
al. 2018a, 2018b), the effect of innovation on 
income inequality in Europe is in fact two-sided. 
To demonstrate this, the authors employ data at 
sub-national level from 2004 to 2014 and proxy 
innovation activities by the number of patents 
(per million inhabitants) while income inequality 
is captured via two indicators, namely the Gini 
coefficient and the share of income accruing to the 
richest 10 %.27
The association between innovation and inequality 
is depicted in Figure 3.10. The left panel indicates 
that areas with more patents display lower levels 
of income inequality, as captured by the Gini 
coefficient. However, the right panel also suggests 
that more patents are associated with a higher 
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Figure 3.10: Dual effects of patenting on inequality in the EU (2004-2014): patents and Gini coefficient  
(left panel) and patents and the top 10 % income share (right panel) 
Notes: Each point refers to a spatial entity in a given year during the period 2004-2014. Similar findings  
are obtained by using the generalised method of moments (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998)  
and fixed-effect estimation techniques. Controls include government size and education.  
Source: JRC calculations based on EU-SILC, BHPS and SOEP data.
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share of income accruing to the richest 10 %  
of income earners. These two different 
relationships are not contradictory. First, 
innovation may raise overall productivity and,  
in turn, benefit workers in the form of higher 
wages. Subsequently, when new knowledge enters 
the wider circulation this raises the productivity 
of other enterprises through so-called spillover 
effects. In other words, the overall income 
distribution becomes more equal. Second,  
in line with the skill-based technological-change 
assumption, innovation increases the productivity 
of highly skilled labour. Furthermore, areas  
of innovation may simply attract highly skilled  
and highly paid workers. The latter two 
mechanisms are likely to increase top incomes.
  3.3.2 Institutional framework
Empirical research supports the idea that  
the institutional framework and its change 
over time is another important determinant for 
structural variations in employment and income 
inequality. The type of welfare state regime seems 
critical in that sense: during the 1990-2007 
period, Northern countries in the EU-15 limited 
the expansion of the lowest-skilled jobs and 
avoided a decline in their working conditions, while 
in the Southern countries, the proportion of the 
lowest-skilled jobs increased and has continued 
hand in hand with the fragmentation of labour 
and ever-more precarious working conditions 
(Peugny 2019). Labour market institutions also 
matter: flexible institutions can facilitate the 
restructuring of productive forces in an economy 
but also challenge low-skilled workers, potentially 
compromising their income share (Alvaredo et 
al. 2013). In the EU, for instance, the share of 
non-standard workers has risen over the past 
decade, with the incidence of involuntary non-
standard employment being highest in Spain, 
Portugal and Poland. These workers are less well 
protected than traditional employees in the event 
of unemployment, face poorer working conditions 
(Green and Livanos 2017) and a higher risk  
of income poverty than standard workers.28  
The rise in non-standard work, as witnessed  
in the EU, has certainly contributed to an increase 
in wage disparities. 
  3.3.3 Globalisation
In a global perspective, empirical and theoretical 
research provide mixed evidence on whether 
financial market and trade liberalisation reduce 
or increase income inequality. Ostry et al. (2014) 
emphasise that it is mainly the design of the 
liberalisation policies, the sequencing of the 
opening up of markets and the type of capital 
flows that determine the impact of globalisation 
on growth, the stability of growth and how equally 
the benefits from globalisation are distributed.  
For this reason, it is important to analyse every 
single episode of liberalisation separately in order 
to assess its impact on income inequality. 
This is the approach followed by recent JRC 
research (Cseres-Gergely and Kvedaras 2020) to 
study the effect of increasing trade pressure from 
China on income inequality in the EU-15, following 
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization 
in 2001. In 2014, EU exports to China were 6.6 
times higher in value added terms compared to 
2000, while Chinese exports to the EU were 6.1 
times higher. Chinese value added embodied in 
high-tech manufacturing sector exports to the 
EU, in particular, saw a remarkable increase: from 
38.7 % in 2000 to 50.6 % in 2014. Over the same 
period, the value added accrued in EU high-tech 
manufacturing to China fell from 57.4 % in 2000 
to 54.8 % in 2014 (Preziosi et al. 2019). Although 
trade pressure from China was already increasing 
before its accession to the WTO, it accelerated 
considerably from 2001 onwards (Figure 3.11). 
Cseres-Gergely and Kvedaras (2020) carried out 
an econometric analysis of 65 EU-15 regions over 
the period 1994-2014 and found that the rise in 
Chinese trade pressure contributed significantly 
to increasing income inequality within the EU-
15 regions.29 Trade pressure worked mainly 
through the manufacturing sector, where – as 
the cross-sector comparison shows – inequality 
3. Income inequality in Europe
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was relatively low during the period considered. 
The decline of the manufacturing sector in the EU 
economy resulted in a shift towards more skill-
intensive production and thus in a polarisation of 
wages within industrial sectors.
 3.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter presents stylised facts on income 
inequality for the whole EU, for the period before, 
during and after the Great Recession. It offers a 
comprehensive picture of income inequality in the EU 
and highlights the contribution of different income 
components. Several income inequality indicators are 
used to describe the evolution of income inequality 
in different parts of the income distribution.
The evidence shows that EU-wide labour income 
inequality was quite stable after 2006 and that 
inequality in household income even declined. In 
North-Western Europe, income levels decreased 
proportionally among all income groups. Income 
inequality in this macro-region was stable and 
relatively low. In contrast, inequality in Southern 
Europe increased significantly from 2006 onwards, 
peaking in 2014. Income levels for the poorest 
10 % fell by at least 30 % between 2007 and 
2014. Although individuals on all income levels 
experienced income losses, the rise of income 
inequality in Southern Europe is mainly due 
to widening differences at the bottom half of 
income distribution. State and intra-household 
redistribution are important insurance mechanisms 
against income shocks, with the latter playing an 
especially important role in Southern Europe. 
During 2007-2014, convergence in terms of income 
levels and inequality in the EU took place not only 
3. Income inequality in Europe
Figure 3.11: Evolution of Chinese trade pressure on EU-15 countries (1995-2010, pressure index  
is set equal to 1 in 2000) 
Notes: Each dot represents a country in a given year. Trade pressure index is calculated using harmonised 
country-level trade data from the OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database. First, a country-level 
index is defined as an average of trade ratios, weighted by their importance in the country’s total exports to  
a given market in 1999. The trade ratios equal to the value of China’s exports to the given market are divided  
by those of a given EU-15 country to the same market in a certain year. This country-level index is projected  
on to regions using their share of manufacturing labour in a given country.  
Source: JRC calculations based on OECD TiVA data.
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because countries with the lowest income levels 
were catching up, but also because of a large 
reduction in income in Southern Europe together 
with growing inequality in the region. In Central 
and Eastern Europe, incomes increased between 
2007 and 2014 in almost all income distribution 
percentiles. The opposite happened in Southern 
Europe. Varying patterns of income change and 
income inequality were probably caused by 
different reactions and adjustments to the financial 
crisis shock. A lasting divergence between North-
Western and Southern Europe might result.
The chapter finally discusses some drivers of 
income inequality. Increased trade pressure 
from China seems to have contributed to rising 
income inequality in the EU overall, especially 
in regions with a strong manufacturing sector. 
Changing labour-market environments caused by 
automatisation and more flexible, non-standard 
employment relations exacerbated some of the 
existing disparities across socio-economic groups. 
The findings in this chapter can provide the basis 
for a discussion on the design of institutions 
guaranteeing the fair compensation and/or 
resilience of those who suffer from the unintended 
consequences of various policies and circumstances. 
3. Income inequality in Europe
   The rise of 
income inequality 
in Southern 
Europe is  
mostly due to  
widening differences 
at the bottom 
half of the income 
distribution.
444. The transmission of inequalities across generations
SUMMARY
When intergenerational social mobility is limited, talented individuals from low 
socio-economic backgrounds face obstacles to moving up the social ladder. This is 
problematic in terms of equality of opportunity and from an economic perspective. 
This chapter presents evidence on social mobility in Europe, based on an analysis 
of the persistence of education attainment across three generations. Individual 
perceptions of social status mobility and beliefs about the importance of equality 
of opportunity and effort for success in life are also discussed. To a large extent, 
inequalities in education are still transmitted from one generation to the next. 
About 74 % of individuals with highly educated parents go on to complete higher 
education themselves, compared to only 28 % of those with less highly educated 
parents. Persistence in educational attainment increases by around 10 pp when also 
considering the influence of grandparents. In Eastern, Western and Southern Europe, 
the persistence of educational attainment across generations is a lot larger than 
in Northern Europe and the Baltics. Data also show that individuals who feel they 
moved up the social ladder as compared to their parents are less inclined to believe 
that success in life is a consequence of family circumstances and more likely to 
attribute it to individual effort.
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Considerations on fairness should reflect 
individuals’ chances to determine their own future, 
work and lifetime perspectives. To understand 
how much people can shape their own fate, it 
is important to investigate the degree to which 
socio-economic status is transmitted across 
generations. In the absence of intergenerational 
mobility, individuals born in disadvantageous 
circumstances ‘are where they are’ just because 
‘they made the mistake of being born to the wrong 
parents’ (Harrington 1962, p. 21). 
There is a moral concern behind the need to address 
socio-economic disadvantages and to ensure that 
people’s socio-economic outcomes are independent 
of their social origins. Intergenerational mobility is 
closely linked with equality of opportunities, a key 
element behind individuals’ perceptions of fairness 
(see Chapter 2). A society where an individual’s 
social status depends on family background (i.e.  
a situation with low levels of intergenerational 
social mobility) offers unequal opportunity sets  
to individuals of a given generation. 
Alongside fairness-related considerations, 
intergenerational mobility also matters from an 
economic perspective. Under-education traps 
prevent gifted children from disadvantageous 
circumstances to develop their potential.  
This creates inefficiencies. Intergenerational 
mobility is also closely related to income 
inequality. High levels of income inequality 
result in more unequal parental investments 
in education, thereby restricting the future 
occupational and income opportunities  
of their offspring. Unequal opportunities,  
in turn, lead to lower intergenerational mobility 
and higher inequalities in the next generation. 
Evidence confirms that countries in which 
economic advantages are passed from  
parents to offspring to a larger extent are  
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also associated with greater income inequality 
(e.g. Corak 2006; 2013). 
To date, research on social status mobility  
across generations has been mainly limited  
by data constraints along two dimensions.  
First, most of the data available includes  
socio-economic status information only for 
parents and children without accounting for  
the role potentially played by previous generations. 
Second, cross-country data often does not cover 
all EU countries. The data used in this chapter 
offers a unique opportunity to investigate  
social-status persistence across three generations 
in the EU Member States and to understand  
if, and by how much, mobility varies across  
macro-regions and has changed across  
birth cohorts. 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.1 
investigates the transmission of educational 
attainment across three generations using 
evidence largely drawn from a recent JRC study 
(Colagrossi et al. 2019a). Section 4.2 discusses 
individual perceptions of social-status mobility 
and beliefs about the importance of equality 
of opportunity and effort for success in life. 
Section 4.3 concludes the chapter.
 4.1 The persistence of educational  
   attainment across generations
Education, income and occupation are  
the most common proxies for measuring  
socio-economic status and its transmission  
across generations. Each measure of social  
status has strengths and weaknesses.  
Individual incomes change over the life cycle. 
Income-based estimates of mobility thus  
tend to suffer from life-cycle bias as it is rarely 
possible to observe lifetime income. In contrast, 
occupation and education vary less over the life 
cycle, so that a one-point-in-time observation  
can provide accurate information, although both 
measures lack an inherent continuous scale, 
making comparisons sometimes difficult.  
This section focuses on the persistence  
of educational attainment across generations 
because of the central importance of education 
for obtaining and achieving opportunities in life.
Educational persistence is measured by an 
offspring’s probability of completing higher 
education, given the educational level of their kin. 
The greater the association between the education 
of kin and children, the higher the persistence 
of educational attainment across generations 
and, hence, the lower the degree of social 
mobility. Intergenerational persistence describes 
the association of socio-economic status (i.e. 
educational attainment) between parent and child. 
Instead, multi-generational persistence refers to 
the association of socio-economic status across 
three (or more) generations (Solon 2018). 
  4.1.1 From parent to child 
Figure 4.1 maps the percentage point (pp)
difference in higher education attainment between 
those with at least one parent who has completed  
higher education and those with less highly 
educated parents. The larger the difference,  
the higher the intergenerational persistence  
of educational attainment.
There is a strong parent-to-child transmission  
of higher education in the EU. A child born in  
a family with at least one parent having achieved 
higher education is, on average, about 43 pp more 
likely to reach higher education than a person  
with less highly educated parents. Family 
background influences the likelihood of obtaining 
higher education in each single EU country, 
although the importance of family characteristics 
differs across countries. Germany, Italy and 
Portugal exhibit the highest degree of educational 
persistence (above 57 pp) followed by Austria, 
Romania and Slovakia (above 50 pp). In Denmark, 
Estonia and Sweden, educational persistence is 
comparatively low. In these countries, growing 
up in a family with at least one highly educated 
parent increases the probability of reaching a 
4. The transmission of inequalities across generations
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similar educational level by about 20 pp (or less).
Differences between educational systems,  
such as streaming students in secondary 
education, barriers to entering higher education, 
the progressivity of higher education fees,  
and the availability of free preschool education, 
are likely to influence cross-country differences  
in educational mobility (see Section 2.4).  
Many other factors not related to educational 
policies could also play a role in explaining  
the observed heterogeneity of social mobility  
across countries (see Box 4.1). Note also  
that differentiation by family background  
also can happen while in tertiary education,  
e.g. through participation in mobility  
programmes (see Box 4.3).
  4.1.2 From grandparent to child
Most of the existing research on social mobility 
across generations takes a parent-to-offspring 
perspective. The underlying assumption is that 
transmission of the socio-economic status across 
generations happens from parent to child. However, 
recent studies show that this approach often leads 
to an underestimation of the persistence of socio-
economic status across multiple generations (Clark 
2014; Lindahl et al. 2015; Adermon et al. 2018; 
Braun and Stuhler 2018). The prevailing explanation 
is that earlier ancestors, such as grandparents, also 
have a direct role in shaping the socio-economic 
outcome of their grandchildren (Anderson et al. 
2018; see Box 4.2 for a methodological discussion). 
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Figure 4.1: Parents-to-
child transmission of 
higher education 
Notes: Percentage point 
difference in higher 
education attainment  
by parental education:  
the darker the shading,  
the higher the parent-
to-child transmission 
of educational attainment. Percentage point categories refer to distribution quantiles. Results are based on 
the estimation of linear probability regression models. All estimates include gender and 10-year age cohort 
indicators. Higher education is defined as ISCED levels 4 (post-secondary non-tertiary education) to 8  
(doctoral level). Survey weights account for population size and socio-demographic characteristics.  
Source: Colagrossi et al. (2019a).
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Figure 4.2 illustrates multi-generational persistence 
across the EU. It maps the degree of association 
between grandfathers’ and grandchildren’s higher 
educational attainment, after considering the direct 
transmission of educational attainment between 
parents and offspring.30 Countries shaded with 
diagonal lines are those for which grandfathers’ 
influence is not statistically different from zero. 
When the influence of grandfathers is accounted 
for, the average persistence of educational 
attainment in the EU increases by 10 pp.  
This suggests that the education of the grandfather 
matters beyond parental education, although  
the influence of grandfathers is substantially  
lower than that of parents.
The role of grandfathers is heterogeneous 
across countries. Grandfathers’ influence on 
educational attainments is negligible in 11 of the 
EU countries. In the remaining 17 Member States, 
grandfathers influence their offspring’s fortune to 
different degrees. In Romania, a highly educated 
grandfather increases the likelihood of achieving 
higher education by 25 pp, even after taking  
into account the parents’ educational level.  
In Croatia, Greece and Hungary, grandfathers’ 
influence amounts to around 15 pp. In Denmark, 
Germany and Belgium, the grandfather effect  
is lower than 10 pp. 
Whether or not grandfathers play a role in  
the transmission of socio-economic outcomes 
does not depend on the degree of parent-to-child 
persistence. Among those countries exhibiting 
the highest levels of parent-to-child educational 
persistence, some do not display any direct 
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Assortative mating describes how individuals 
select their partners following certain 
characteristics, e.g. more educated individuals 
marrying more educated individuals or richer 
individuals marrying richer individuals  
(Schwartz and Mare 2005). How much husbands 
and wives or cohabiting partners resemble  
each other in terms of socio-economic status  
is informative about the openness or closeness  
of the social hierarchy within a society.  
Assortative mating is part of the dynamic  
process of intergenerational social mobility as  
the education levels of husbands and wives 
influence fertility choices and the educational 
attainments of their offspring (Mare 2000).
In a recent study, Eika et al. (2018) examine 
the influence of assortative mating on income 
inequality in the Western world over the past 
decades and find that changes in assortative 
mating alone hardly impacted the time trend in 
box 4.1  Assortative mating
household income inequality in the USA and some 
European countries between the 1960s and the 
2010s. Instead, an increase in economic returns to 
education over time and the changing educational 
composition of society account for a massive 
change in household income inequality.
Naszodi and Mendonca (2019a, 2019b) show  
that changing marital preferences over a partner’s 
educational traits made individuals increasingly 
more inclined to marry others with similar 
educational traits after the turn of the millennium 
in all countries investigated (France, Hungary, 
Portugal, Romania and the USA). The authors 
also point out that the changing preferences 
are strongly related to the labour market return 
associated with educational attainment.  
These findings suggest that labour market and 
tax reforms not only have direct consequences 
on employment and income inequality but also 
impact family formation.
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The analysis of social mobility is based on 
data from the special Eurobarometer survey 
on ’Fairness, inequality and intergenerational 
mobility’ (EC 2018e). This is the first EU-wide 
survey containing retrospective information 
on educational attainment, occupation and 
(subjective) social status of the respondents’ 
parents and grandparents. Such retrospective data 
poses some challenges. First, when respondents 
are asked to provide information on past events, 
they might not recall them or may provide 
box 4.2  Estimating intergenerational social mobility – methodological challenges
unreliable answers. Second, whereas such surveys 
are representative of the offspring's generation 
(the respondents), they are not representative 
at the level of parents’ and grandparents’ 
generations. Third, findings of a positive association 
between grandparents’ and grandchildren’s 
socio-economic status do not necessarily imply 
a causal relationship. As discussed in Braun and 
Stuhler (2018), Clark (2014) and Solon (2014), 
measurement errors and/or omitted variables bias 
might plague such estimations.
Figure 4.2: 
Grandfather-to-child 
transmission of higher 
education
Notes: Percentage point 
differences in higher 
education attainment by 
grandfathers’ education: 
the darker the shade, the 
higher the grandfather-
to-child transmission 
of higher education. 
Countries in which the 
effect is not significant 
are shaded with diagonal 
lines. Percentage point 
categories refer to the 
distribution quantiles. 
Results are based on the estimation of linear probability regression models. Besides the two indicators on the 
higher education attainment of parents and grandfathers, all estimates include gender and 10-year age cohort 
indicators. Higher education is defined as ISCED levels 4 (post-secondary non-tertiary education) to 8  
(doctoral level). Survey weights account for population size and socio-demographic characteristics.  
Source: Colagrossi et al. (2019a).
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grandparental effect (e.g. Austria, Italy and Portugal), 
while others (e.g. Germany, Greece and Romania) do. 
Similarly, a weak parent-to-child persistence does 
not imply that the grandfathers’ influence is null, as 
shown by the figures for Denmark and Lithuania. 
Overall, the persistence of educational attainments 
across generations is stronger than suggested by 
the simple parent-to-child framework. Thus, mobility 
appears to be lower when three generations are 
observed compared to only two.
The transmission channels through which 
grandparents might directly influence their 
grandchildren’s educational attainment are not 
yet fully understood. Plausible explanations 
include the role of grandparents as caregivers and 
providers of emotional and financial support. The 
strength of the effect, running from grandparent 
to grandchild, might depend on the intensity of 
social interactions. Accordingly, cultural norms 
about the appropriate role of grandparents and 
national institutional characteristics (e.g. regarding 
the universal access to high-quality, inexpensive 
childcare) might mediate the grandparent effect.
Macro-regional patterns
The persistence of socio-economic status over 
three generations is heterogeneous across 
European countries. Figure 4.3 summarises 
macro-regional patterns. Each bar shows 
overall educational attainment persistence 
while accounting for the role of parents and 
grandfathers, respectively. The different colours 
document how much of this persistence is due to 
parents (dark blue) and grandfathers (light blue).
In Eastern, Western and Southern Europe,  
the persistence of educational attainment 
across generations is (almost) twice as large as 
in Northern Europe and the Baltics. Southern 
European countries display the highest parent-to-
child persistence. The Benelux region takes  
a middle position when it comes to the influence 
of parents’ education but stands out because 
grandfathers’ education does not affect  
children’s educational outcomes.  
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   When the influence  
of grandfathers  
is accounted for,  
the persistence of 
educational attainment  
in the EU increases  
by 10 percentage points.
Figure 4.3: Transmission of higher education across 
generations: EU macro-regional patterns
Notes: Bars show the percentage point difference 
in higher education attainment by parents’ and 
grandfather’s educational attainment. Results are based 
on the estimation of linear probability regression 
models. Besides the two indicators on the higher 
education attainment of parents and grandfathers,  
all estimates include gender, 10-year age cohort,  
and country indicators. Higher education is defined as 
ISCED levels 4 (post-secondary non-tertiary education) 
to 8 (doctoral level). The estimates are weighted for 
population size and demographics. Macro-regions: 
Baltic: EE, LV, LT. Benelux: BE, LU, NL East: BG, HR, 
CZ, HU, PL, RO, SK, SL. North: DK, FI, SE. South: CY, 
EL, IT, MT, PT, ES. West: AT, FR, DE, IE, UK.
Source: JRC calculations based on the Eurobarometer on 
Fairness (EC 2018e). Survey weights account for socio-
demographic characteristics.
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Research generally shows that international 
student mobility (a temporary study abroad, 
embedded in a study programme at a home 
university) produces positive labour market returns 
(Schnepf and d’Hombres 2019). However, there 
is a growing concern that these benefits are not 
equally distributed as students from a lower socio-
economic background are less likely to take part 
in these schemes. In the UK, Italy and Hungary, 
students with highly educated parents are twice as 
likely to take up student mobility programmes as 
their peers with less highly educated parents  
(left-hand figure). This general pattern can also be 
found in other countries (Hauschildt et al. 2015).
Unequal uptake of student mobility is generally 
described as the result of choices made by students 
from different socio-economic backgrounds. Their  
choices are often explained by inequality of oppor-
tunity (e.g. the less advantaged have more finan-
cial constraints), inequality of information (i.e. the 
less advantaged have less knowledge about grant 
box 4.3 Drivers of unequal access to international higher education mobility
opportunities) and differing evaluations of mobility 
benefits. Recent studies by the JRC stress that not 
only student choices but also university characteris-
tics matter when explaining the unequal uptake of 
student mobility (Schnepf and Colagrossi 2020). 
The right-hand figure shows that UK universities 
with a high share of students with parents of 
low education send fewer students abroad. The 
concentration of students with a high socio-economic 
status in specific universities is an important 
explanation for student mobility uptake, even after 
taking individual characteristics into account.  
The same results are found for Germany, Hungary 
and Italy. Thus, students with less highly educated 
parents face a double penalty: they are less likely to 
attend a university where mobility is high and have a 
lower likelihood of participating in mobility schemes, 
given their socio-economic background. It follows 
that student mobility could become more inclusive 
if grant funding and incentives targeted universities 
with a high proportion of less-advantaged students. 
Figure: Percent of mobile students by parental 
background and country; graduation years between 
2005 and 2015
Notes: Bars show the percentage of tertiary graduates 
taking part in student mobility by parental education.
Source: Schnepf et al. (2020).
Figure: Percent of students with less highly educated 
parents and overall mobility uptake in universities  
in the UK
Source: Schnepf and Colagrossi (2020).
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Grandfathers are especially important in Western 
and Eastern Europe. Accounting for the influence 
of grandfathers on grandchildren’s attainment, 
educational persistence in Northern Europe proves 
to be slightly higher than is usually portrayed. 
Changes in educational persistence over time
Educational persistence across generations might 
not only differ across countries (and macro-regions), 
but also across birth cohorts. Figure 4.4 shows 
the persistence associated with parents (dark-blue 
bars) and grandfathers (light-blue bars) for four 
birth cohorts of offspring, namely: (i) those born 
Before 1946; (ii) the Baby Boomer (1946-1964);  
(iii) Generation X (1965-1980); and (iv)  
the Millennials (1981-2002). 
On average, across all European countries, multi-
generational educational persistence remains 
very similar for those generations born before 
1946 and the Baby Boomers. There seems to be 
a substantial improvement in intergenerational 
social mobility in the subsequent period with a 
reduction in educational persistence by about 11 pp 
between the Baby Boomers and Generation X. 
This improvement is not visible among the 
Millennials. Instead, a shift occurred in the (relative) 
importance of grandfathers and parents. While  
the influence of grandfathers appears much 
smaller than in the previous generation, the parent-
to-offspring link is stronger than for Generation X. 
Increases in affordable childcare services and  
early childhood education might partly explain  
the reduction in the influence of grandfathers.
  4.1.3 The role of educational policies
Policies recently implemented in Europe with the aim 
of tackling intergenerational educational persistence 
can be described according to three dimensions: 
4. The transmission of inequalities across generations
Figure 4.4: Transmission of higher education across 
generations: changes over time
Notes: Bars show the percentage point difference 
in higher education attainment by parent and 
grandfather educational attainment. Results are based 
on the estimation of linear probability regression 
models. Besides the two indicators on the higher 
education attainment of parents and grandfathers, 
all estimates include gender and country indicators. 
Higher education is defined as ISCED levels 4 (post-
secondary non-tertiary education) to 8 (doctoral 
level). The Baby Boomers are those born between 
1946 and 1964; Generation X between 1965 and 1980; 
and the Millennials, between 1981 and 2002.
Source: JRC calculations based on the Eurobarometer  
on Fairness (EC 2018e). Survey weights account for socio-
demographic characteristics.
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‘tracking versus comprehensive schooling’, ‘school 
autonomy versus centralisation’, and ‘curriculum  
and instruction’ (Volante et al. 2019).
Tracking refers to children being taught in different 
school types or programmes that provide varying 
learning targets and prestige. There is compelling 
evidence that tracking hampers educational social 
mobility (Strietholt et al. 2019) and increases social 
segregation across schools (Chzhen et al. 2018). 
Reforms postponing the age at which pupils are 
tracked usually result in greater intergenerational 
mobility, without significant effects on average 
educational achievements (Lange and von Werder 
2017; Pekkarinen 2018). 
School autonomy refers to providing management 
autonomy for schools. Advocates of school 
autonomy argue that it increases the efficiency of 
public spending and administration, while critics 
believe that lower levels of centralisation result in 
school systems predominantly serving privileged 
children (Strietholt et al. 2019). Empirical studies 
show that under conditions of greater school 
autonomy students from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds fare worse than students with a high 
socio-economic status (Horn, 2009). Countries 
like Sweden and Finland, which introduced school 
autonomy during recent decades, did indeed 
experience a relative increase in educational 
inequalities (Volante et al. 2019). However, 
research generally fails to establish a link between 
centralisation and educational equality (Horn 
2009; Strietholt et al. 2019). What matters seems 
to be the correct overall balance between school 
autonomy and centralisation. Germany, and to 
some extent Italy, introduced school autonomy 
paired with components of centralisation (such 
as the greater accountability of schools, national 
exams, and school inspections and accreditation) 
which resulted in reducing the socio-economic 
achievement gap (Volante et al. 2019). 
Policies on curriculum and instruction focus on 
educational content and teaching in order to 
achieve a more inclusive learning environment. 
Extending the availability of high-quality, publicly 
funded preschool childcare tends to reduce social 
inequalities (Blossfeld et al. 2017). Similarly, raising 
the compulsory school age is associated with 
lowering the dropout rates and hence lowering the 
inequality of educational attainment. Recently, some 
EU countries (e.g. the United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Italy) have changed their curriculum, reducing it to 
more basic and factual content. While there is a 
lack of research examining the effect of curriculum-
content change, country results seem to indicate 
that they are associated with improving social 
mobility in education outcomes (Volante et al. 2019). 
 4.2 Intergenerational mobility  
    and perceptions of equality  
    of opportunity 
Both objective indicators and subjective measures 
can be used to better understand social mobility 
across generations. Applying the latter is important 
since individual decisions are not only based on 
preferences and objective information but also on 
beliefs and perceptions.31 Indeed, researchers have 
long argued that differences between American 
and European citizens in their attitudes towards 
the welfare system are driven by different beliefs 
about mobility in their society rather than by their 
true underlying value (Lipset and Bendix 1959; 
Alesina et al. 2017). In addition, objective indicators 
of social status are somehow partial measures of 
the ‘family’s real social competence’ (Clark 2014,  
p. 108). In other words, some of the advantages that 
are passed across generations are unmeasurable. 
Therefore, self-perceived measures might provide 
insights otherwise missed by objective indicators.
  4.2.1 Self-perceived intergenerational  
    mobility in Europe
The special Eurobarometer on Fairness (EC 2018e) 
provides the opportunity to monitor self-perceived 
intergenerational mobility as respondents were 
asked to place themselves and their parents on a 
hypothetical social ladder. A respondent assigning 
to him- or herself a higher social ladder than to 
4. The transmission of inequalities across generations
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his or her parents is assumed to have a perception 
of upward intergenerational social mobility. If, on 
the other hand, the respondent positions him- or 
herself on a lower rank than his or her parents, 
the individual has a perception of downward 
intergenerational mobility.32 
Figure 4.5 shows that in the EU, 33 % of individuals 
believe they have moved up the social ladder 
and about 23 % consider that their social status 
is lower than that of their parents. The share of 
respondents reporting upward mobility varies 
between 41 % in Northern Europe and 31 % in 
Southern Europe. About half of the respondents 
identify themselves on the same level of the social 
hierarchy as their parents. In all regions, the share 
of respondents who experienced upward mobility 
is higher than the share of those who feel they are 
on a lower social level than their parents.
Figure 4.6 displays the share of respondents 
reporting upward, downward and no inter-
generational social mobility by birth cohort. 
Results should be interpreted with care since 
individuals at different phases of their life  
(life-cycle bias) are being compared.33 
Nevertheless, interesting patterns emerge.  
In Eastern Europe, the percentage of respondents 
having experienced downward mobility is about 
the same for Baby Boomers, Generation X and 
Millennials. The gap between Millennials and 
Generation X is widest in Northern Europe and 
Western Europe. The high share of respondents 
with perceptions of downward mobility in these 
two macro-regions (shown in Figure 4.5) is thus 
largely driven by the Millennials. Note that  
in Southern and Western Europe, fewer Millennials 
have experienced upward mobility than in  
the Baltics and Eastern Europe.
  4.2.2 Getting ahead in life: equality  
    of opportunities and meritocratic  
    perceptions 
Social mobility and its perception are closely  
linked to equality of opportunity: societies with 
more equal opportunities tend to display higher 
social mobility. Equality of opportunity is indeed  
a prerequisite for effort and merit to be rewarded, 
resulting in individuals experiencing social  
mobility accordingly.
About 41 % of European adults do not believe 
that they have equal opportunities to succeed and 
more than 35 % of the adult population think  
that to get ahead in life it is important to come 
from a wealthy family (see Figure 4.7). 
Figure 4.5: Self-perceived intergenerational mobility 
by EU macro-region
Notes: Self-reported social mobility derives from 
the comparison between the respondents’ current 
position on the social ladder and their parents’ position. 
Individuals experienced downward mobility if they 
place themselves in a lower position than their parents, 
no mobility if they perceive themselves to be at the same 
level as them, and upward mobility if they feel better off 
than their parents. To account for the ceiling effect,  
we also assign upward mobility to those who report  
the same position as their parents, if this corresponds  
to the highest position on the social ladder.
Source: JRC calculations based on the Eurobarometer on 
Fairness (EC 2018e). Survey weights account for population  
size and socio-demographic characteristics. 
4. The transmission of inequalities across generations
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
South WestEU Baltic Benelux North
Sh
ar
e 
%
Upward social 
mobility
No social 
mobility
Downward social 
mobility
East
31.3
49.7
19.3
33.6
41.6
25.4
33.6
44.1
22.6
35.0
40.2
25.3
35.6
41.9
23.0
41.2
34.5
24.5
34.5
45.4
20.3
55
Figure 4.6: 
Self-perceived 
intergenerational 
mobility by macro-
region and birth cohort
Notes: Perceived social 
mobility derives from 
the comparison between 
the respondents’ current 
position on the social 
ladder and their parents’ 
position. A person is 
considered to experience 
upward mobility if his or 
her position on the social ladder is higher than that of their parents. This hypothetical social ladder ranges from 
1 to 10. To account for the ceiling effect, a person is also considered as mobile if both they and their parents are 
on position 10. Baby Boomers are those born between 1946 and 1964; Generation X between 1965 and 1980; and the 
Millennials between 1981 and 2002. Macro-regions: Baltic: EE, LV, LT. Benelux: BE, LU, NL East: BG, HR, CZ, 
HU, PL, RO, SK, SL. North: DK, FI, SE. South: CY, EL, IT, MT, PT, ES. West: AT, FR, DE, IE, UK.
Source: JRC calculations based on the Eurobarometer on Fairness (EC 2018e). Survey weights account for population size  
and socio-demographic characteristics. 
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Figure 4.7: Beliefs about equality of opportunity and the role of merit 
Notes: Equal opportunities plot the share of individuals agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement 
‘Nowadays in [OUR COUNTRY] I have equal opportunities for getting ahead in life, like everyone else’.  
Work hard and Wealthy family plot the share of subjects who think it is ‘essential’ or ‘very important’ to work 
hard or to come from a wealthy family to get ahead in life. Macro-regions: Baltic: EE, LV, LT. Benelux: BE, LU, 
NL East: BG, HR, CZ, HU, PL, RO, SK, SL. North: DK, FI, SE. South: CY, EL, IT, MT, PT, ES.  
West: AT, FR, DE, IE, UK. 
Source: JRC calculations based on the Eurobarometer on Fairness (EC 2018e). Survey weights account for population size  
and socio-demographic characteristics. 
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The belief that working hard is an important 
element for getting ahead in life appears to 
be shared somewhat uniformly across Europe. 
There are some clear macro-regional differences 
concerning the perception of equality of opportunity 
and the importance attributed to social background 
for being successful in life. Individuals in Nordic, 
Benelux and Western Member States have very 
positive perceptions concerning the equality of 
opportunity in their countries. In Northern countries, 
81 % of respondents believe equal opportunities 
prevail in their country and 12 % report that coming 
from a wealthy family plays an important role as 
regards moving on in life. In contrast, about half of 
Eastern and Southern European citizens attribute 
great importance to coming from a wealthy family 
to get ahead in life while less than half of the 
population has the perception of living in a society 
which offers equal opportunities.
These findings are a source of concern. Believing 
that society does not offer equal opportunities 
negatively affects individuals’ perceptions of 
fairness and has the potential to undermine trust 
in traditional institutions and to create discontent. 
How do these beliefs relate to intergenerational 
mobility? The panels in Figure 4.8 depict the relation 
between (self-perceived) intergenerational mobility 
and: (i) beliefs about the importance of working 
hard to get ahead in life; (ii) perceptions about 
the equality of opportunity; and (iii) beliefs 
about the importance of coming from a wealthy 
family to get ahead in life. In the EU, individuals’ 
beliefs about the importance of hard work and 
equality of opportunity are clearly associated with 
intergenerational mobility. Individuals who have 
experienced upward mobility are less likely to 
believe that success in life is the consequence  
of family circumstances and are more inclined 
to attribute it to individual efforts. For example, 
two individuals being in the 5th and 95th percentile 
respectively of the self-perceived mobility 
distribution have, other things being equal, a 
difference of 14 pp in the predicted probability 
of perceiving to have equal opportunities to 
get ahead in life. These findings support the 
hypothesis that intergenerational mobility is 
closely linked to beliefs about the equality of 
opportunity and the value of merit in the economic 
system. Such beliefs might, in turn, directly shape 
policy preferences and hence could influence  
inequality dynamics. 
 4.3 Concluding remarks
To a large extent, inequalities in education in 
Europe are still transmitted from one generation 
to the next. About 74 % of individuals with highly 
educated parents go on to complete higher 
education themselves, compared to only 28 % 
of those with less highly educated parents. 
Individuals’ education opportunities are also 
associated with the socio-economic background 
of their grandparents. Persistence of educational 
attainment increases by around 10 pp when 
considering the influence of grandparents.  
In Eastern, Western and Southern Europe, the 
persistence of educational attainment across 
generations is a lot stronger than in Northern 
Europe and the Baltics.
A more comprehensive view of multi-generational 
persistence requires expanding this analysis in  
at least two directions. First, the intergenerational 
transmission of a variety of other outcomes 
should be analysed, among them economic 
(income, occupation, wealth) but also health and 
social dimensions. Second, other circumstances  
(beyond parental background) potentially affect 
the lifetime perspective. These include, for example, 
the place of birth and childhood neighbourhood.34 
Ongoing JRC research is trying to provide  
a broader overview of inequality of opportunity  
by comparing the level of inequality of opportunity 
in education, income and wealth whilst considering 
a set of additional circumstances (area of birth, 
language spoken at home, etc.).35
Besides objective measures of social mobility, 
individuals’ mobility perceptions also matter. 
Individuals with a perception of intergenerational 
4. The transmission of inequalities across generations
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social upward mobility are less inclined  
to believe that success in life is a consequence  
of family circumstances and more likely to 
attribute it to individual effort. Future research 
should therefore further explore individual 
perceptions and beliefs about intergenerational 
and horizontal mobility and investigate how  
they are linked to policy-related preferences  
and political attitudes.
To summarise, the EU is not yet a continent  
of equal opportunity. Given the self-reinforcing 
relationship between the persistence of socio-
economic status across generations and  
the dynamics of income inequality, together  
with the link between self-perceived social mobility 
and beliefs about fairness-related perceptions, 
ensuring social mobility across generations is all 
the more important for a well-functioning Europe.
Figure 4.8: Relation between self-perceived 
intergenerational mobility and individuals’ perceptions
Notes: The y axes report beliefs about the 
importance of: (i) working hard, (ii) equal 
opportunities, and (iii) coming from a wealthy 
family to get ahead in life, whilst the x-axis displays 
the magnitude of the perceived intergenerational 
mobility. Perceived social mobility on the x-axis 
derives from the comparison between the 
respondents’ current position on the social ladder and 
their parents’ position. This hypothetical social ladder 
ranges from 1 to 10 and hence the individual value 
of perceived mobility ranges between -9 to 9. On the 
three plots, individual measures of perceived mobility 
are grouped into 100 equal-sized bins (centiles), 
and the means of the x-axis and y-axis variables 
are computed within each bin and plotted on the 
graph. Therefore, each dot represents the predicted 
probability y of agreeing with the aforementioned 
questions for a given level of perceived social mobility 
keeping the controls constant (country, generation 
and gender-specific effects). Dashed lines indicate the 
fitted linear trend. 
Source: JRC calculations based on the Eurobarometer on 
Fairness (EC 2018e). 
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585. Challenges for welfare states in the EUs
SUMMARY
The social model of European welfare states is unique in providing collective 
insurance against risks which are either not or are only insufficiently insurable in the 
market. Most welfare states in Europe spend more than 50 % of their budgets on 
social protection, health and education. Redistribution achieved through taxes and 
transfers reduces income inequality by 30 %. However, a rising share of individuals 
in atypical employment conditions, which are associated with high levels of job 
insecurity, lack social insurance coverage. On the financing side, tax evasion and 
tax avoidance are major concerns for EU Member States’ fiscal policy. There is an 
extensive mismatch between the place where the economic activity occurs and the 
place where profits are reported, especially for web companies. Tax avoidance is 
facilitated by a corporate taxation system which is no longer in line with fluid and 
intangible economies. Similarly, tax evasion violates basic principles of tax justice. 
All this limits the capacity of welfare states to uphold their social contract. Chapter 5 
highlights the potential for policy interventions on tax evasion, tax avoidance and the 
extension of social protection to atypical workers, resulting in fairer societies with 
additional revenues for redistribution.
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The European social model opened up broad access 
to education, healthcare and pensions and provides 
collective insurance against risks which are either 
not or are only insufficiently insurable in the market. 
While specific welfare arrangements differ across 
countries, most governments in the EU spend more 
than 50 % of their budgets on social protection, 
health and education. In 2017, this amounted to 
41.1 % of total government expenditure on social 
protection, 15.3 % on health and 10.2 %  
on education. 
On average, these expenditures correspond  
to 30.4 % of gross domestic product (GDP),  
with 18.8 % being attributed to social protection 
while health and education expenditures  
amount to 7 % and 4.6 % of GDP, respectively  
(see Figure 5.1).36
The success of welfare states cannot reasonably 
be evaluated on the basis of their expenditure 
alone, but by their ability to ensure the welfare 
of their inhabitants and to create inclusive and 
cohesive societies. International comparisons 
suggest that many EU Member States are 
comparatively successful in providing public 
services for a high standard of living with 
relative low levels of corruption, wide access to 
health services (Fullman et al. 2018) and a clean 
environment.37 Substantial redistribution, which 
is often seen as an important element of a fair 
society, is achieved through taxes and transfers: 
across all EU countries, the tax-transfer system 
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Figure 5.1: Expenditure on social protection, health and education as per cent of GDP 2017 
Notes: EU social protection expenditure includes social benefits or transfers, in cash or in kind, to households and 
individuals associated with sickness/healthcare and invalidism, disability, old age, parental responsibilities, the loss 
of a spouse or parent, unemployment, housing or social exclusion. It also includes administrative expenses. Health 
expenditure includes medical products, appliances and equipment, outpatient services, hospital services, public 
health services, and research and development (R&D) related to health. Education expenditure includes pre-primary, 
primary, secondary and tertiary education, post-secondary non-tertiary education, education not definable by level, 
subsidiary services to education and R&D. 
Source: JRC elaboration of Eurostat data.
Figure 5.2: The equalising effect of taxes and transfers varies widely across EU Member States, 2016 
Notes: Eurostat data are available for all EU Member States and refer to 2017. OECD data are available 
for 23 EU Member States: no data is available for Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta and Romania. EU* refers to 
the EU for Eurostat data and to the 23 Member States mentioned for OECD data. This figure shows the level 
of Gini coefficients before and after taxes and social transfers using data from two different sources, OECD 
and Eurostat.  
Source: Eurostat and OECD Income Distribution and Poverty (database).
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reduced the Gini coefficient by 13 pp in 2016  
(from 43 % for market incomes to about 30 %  
for net incomes; see Figure 5.2).
Notwithstanding the positive message conveyed 
by this aggregate measure, political discontent 
creating upheaval in the EU political landscape 
indicates some dissatisfaction with the current 
status quo. For a long time, the EU’s welfare 
states have served their citizens, but the global 
economic crisis from 2008 onwards and various 
subsequent socio-economic shocks have tested 
the current social arrangements. In addition, 
EU welfare states face structural challenges. 
Digital technologies, the automation of routine 
and low-skilled jobs as well as the growing 
importance of non-standard work have coincided 
with a decline in the labour share and the cost 
of capital investment, facilitating capital-labour 
substitution.38 In addition, factor mobility, 
internationalisation and digitalisation have 
created multiple opportunities for tax competition 
among countries and for tax avoidance and/
or evasion by multinational corporations and 
wealthy individuals alike. This has reduced the 
available resources to ensure the sustainability 
of welfare systems. In light of these changes,  
the financing and redistributive properties of 
welfare systems must be reviewed.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as 
follows: Section 5.1 reviews some of the challenges 
for EU welfare systems whilst Section 5.2 
discusses specific features of taxation systems 
which are relevant in the pursuit of an inclusive 
and fair Europe. Section 5.3 concludes this chapter.
 5.1 European welfare states  
   under pressure
Welfare state arrangements in the EU are facing 
three main challenges: demographic change, 
technological change and globalisation.39 The impact 
of such changes has been felt differently by different 
people, creating horizontal inequalities, i.e. different  
outcomes across age, gender and skill groups.40
Demographic changes caused by lower fertility 
rates and longer life expectancy result in ageing 
populations.41 While longer and healthier lives are 
highly desirable, an ageing population challenges 
pay-as-you-go welfare schemes as dependency 
ratios increase. Changing population structures 
and shifting economic realities result in higher 
uncertainties. Younger people in particular are 
employed in atypical work arrangements that 
entail higher levels of personal job insecurity  
(EC 2016a, Eurofound 2018). 
Globalisation entails the expansion of trade  
and integration of national economies in  
the world market.42 For the EU, this implies an 
increase in imports of labour-intensive goods 
which goes hand in hand with growing competition 
in national labour markets (Gebel and Giesecke 
2016). Changing labour-market requirements and 
pressure on wages, especially for the low-skilled, 
result in an uneven distribution of the benefits 
of globalisation. Unskilled workers are more 
vulnerable to change and carry a greater burden 
in terms of income and unemployment insecurity. 
These vulnerabilities increased further with  
the Great Recession. 
Technological change influences the organisation 
of society in general and the organisation of 
production in particular. Recent decades have 
been characterised by skill-biased technological 
change, i.e. technological change which favours 
skilled labour over unskilled labour by increasing 
its relative productivity. In addition, jobs with 
strong routine elements on all skill levels are 
increasingly automated (EC 2018a, EC 2018b). 
Both developments have changed the demand 
for labour and influenced the composition of 
skill requirements in European labour markets. 
In 2018, the unemployment rate of those with 
low education in the EU was 13.3 %, compared 
to 6.2 % for individuals with upper and post-
secondary education and 4.1 % for those with 
tertiary education. Technological change shifted 
the demand for specific occupations and changed 
the organisation of labour. Platform work, whereby 
5. Challenges for welfare states in the EU
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short-term employment opportunities are offered 
or brokered by online platforms, is an example of 
recent types of non-standard work relations. In 
2018, around 10 % of Europeans provided some 
work services through online platforms  
(EC 2018a, EC 2018b). 
More generally in the EU, the last decades have 
seen a shift away from traditional, full-time, 
open-ended employment towards atypical forms 
of work, which include temporary jobs, part-time 
work, casual work and solo self-employment.43 
Between 2002 and 2017, the share of atypical 
workers in the EU rose by 4 pp, from 38 % to 
around 42 %. Changes in atypical employment 
relations are depicted in Figure 5.3. While atypical 
types of work can provide flexibility and enable 
people to find their individually appropriate work-
life balance, they are also associated with higher 
income volatility and lower job security  
(EC 2018b; Eurofound 2018). 
Whilst often serving as a stepping stone into 
stable employment, the expansion of non-
standard work has led to greater job insecurity 
and precariousness, with negative consequences 
for knowledge and skill accumulation, health  
and well-being. The growing importance  
of non-standard forms of work challenges social 
prodection systems which are generally tailored 
to standard full-time employment and remain 
ill-suited to the needs of atypical workers. 
Although atypical employees are normally  
subject to the same eligibility rules for benefits,  
it is often difficult for them to meet the required 
conditions, which means they are de facto 
excluded. The self-employed are sometimes 
completely excluded or can only opt in 
voluntarily.44
 
Differences in unemployment insurance coverage 
for standard and non-standard employees and  
the self-employed are depicted in Figure 5.4. 
5. Challenges for welfare states in the EUs
Before the crisis, several EU Member States 
experienced a reallocation of employment from 
the primary and manufacturing sectors to 
construction and services. The economic crisis 
weakened demand and resulted in job losses. 
The construction sector followed a 'boom-bust' 
pattern, i.e. it made a strong, positive contribution 
to job creation before the crisis, followed by large 
losses in employment both during and after the 
crisis. The dynamics in the construction sector 
were driven by developments in real-estate 
markets and the financial sector which changed 
abruptly in the crisis. The service sector was the 
only sector to increase employment after the 
crisis, although at a much lower rate than before. 
This was probably due to growth in demand 
and competitiveness gains in well-paid jobs like 
box 5.1  Sectorial and regional dynamics in employment in several EU Member States  
between 2000 and 2014
computer programming, information services,  
and professional and technical activities.  
There are important macro-regional patterns in 
employment change by sector. Whilst most macro-
regions managed to maintain employment growth 
even after the financial crisis, thanks to a resilient 
service sector, Southern Europe experienced a 
significant change in employment dynamics:  
from 2 000 until the crisis, employment increased 
by 7.5 million, while after the crisis, 6 million jobs 
were lost. This huge drop in employment was 
largely caused by losses in consumption and 
investment and by lower labour demand from 
the manufacturing sector. In contrast to more 
successful macro-regions, in Southern Europe job 
reallocation to the service sector was restrained 
(Martínez-Turégano 2019).
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Many social-security systems offer less 
protection to atypical workers than they  
do to traditional full-time employees.  
This holds true for most EU countries, although 
substantial differences exist. The gaps in 
coverage are even more evident for the self-
employed as in most countries this category 
of worker is not eligible for unemployment 
insurance. Reducing the divide between 
traditional employees and atypical workers  
will require better protection for the latter.
In this context, a recent JRC study  
(Jara and Tumino 2018) assesses the effects 
of a hypothetical reform in which eligibility for 
unemployment insurance benefits would be 
extended to self-employed workers with the 
same conditions as for standard employees.  
This affects all Members States except Denmark, 
Hungary, Croatia, Poland, Slovenia, Czechia, 
Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden, where the self-
employed are compulsorily covered (see Jara and 
Tumino 2018 and Box 5.2 for more information).
5. Challenges for welfare states in the EU
    The growing 
importance  
of non-standard  
forms of work 
challenges  
social protection 
systems.
Figure 5.3: Changes in non-standard employment over the last 15 years (2003-2018) 
Notes: The percentage change between 2003 and 2018 of employees working in non-standard employment  
by type of contract, i.e. part-time or temporary contract. The EU average is provided by Eurostat.  
Source: Calculations based on Eurostat.
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Figure 5.5 shows the net replacement rates, 
i.e. households’ disposable income in the event 
of unemployment as a share of the pre-
unemployment net income, with and without 
the reform. Extending the eligible rules for 
unemployment insurance for regular workers to 
self-employed workers would significantly increase 
their level of income protection and, hence, reduce 
poverty risks for this category of workers. More 
specifically, the risk of poverty among the self-
employed in the event of unemployment would, 
on average, drop from 25 % to 15 % (see Jara and 
Tumino 2018 for more information). The largest 
reductions in the share of self-employed at risk 
of poverty would be observed in Belgium and 
Germany. In addition, this reform would narrow 
the poverty gap, meaning that the reforms would 
not only reduce the risk of poverty in the event of 
unemployment, but would also reduce its severity.
Needless to say, such a reform would come at a 
price. According to Jara and Tumino (2018), the 
average extra cost per self-employed person 
entering unemployment would range from 4 % of 
the country’s median household disposable income 
in Ireland to 80 % in Bulgaria. Additional costs are 
above 50 % of the median household disposable 
income in 4 out of 28 countries. Nevertheless, in the 
face of increasing disparities across categories of 
workers, welfare states need to adapt their policies 
and instruments to protect those most vulnerable.
 5.2 Fiscal policies for social justice  
   and inclusive growth
For EU Member States, taxes are the main 
source of government revenue. They provide 
the resources to finance education, health and 
public goods which are elementary for a fair 
5. Challenges for welfare states in the EUs
Figure 5.4: Potential coverage of unemployment insurance schemes in the EU (% share by type of worker) 
Notes: The figure shows each EU Member State’s potential coverage rate from their existing unemployment 
insurance for the entire working population (all), non-standard (atypical) workers, standard (typical) workers and 
the self-employed. Potential coverage measures the proportion of workers who would be covered by unemployment 
insurance schemes in the event of unemployment, based on their previous work history (months of work during 
the previous year). Non-standard workers refer to individuals with low work intensity, i.e. with weekly working 
hours less than one-third of the country median or with working hours equal to the weekly median but less than 
four months. Standard workers refer to individuals with weekly working hours more than one-third of the country 
median, and self-employed individuals are those who have self-employment income.  
Source: Jara and Tumino (2018).
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and inclusive society and, in general, can only be 
insufficiently provided by markets. For a fair and 
inclusive society, the inequality of living standards 
and incomes must not get too large (Boarini et al. 
2018; see also Chapter 2). Redistribution through 
taxes and transfers reduces the inequality of 
market incomes (see Figure 5.2). 
Progressive taxation is a central instrument 
for redistribution and the reduction of income 
inequality (Stiglitz 2018; Bussolo et al. 2019). 
However, over the last two decades, many 
countries reduced personal top income tax rates 
and flattened their tax schedules. For example, 
in 1980, the personal top income tax rate stood 
at 60 % in France, 56 % in Germany and 72 % in 
Italy, whilst in 2018, those rates were equal to 
51.5 %, 47.5 % and 47.2 %, respectively (Brys et 
al. 2016, EC 2018c). Across EU Member States, 
the top personal income tax rate dropped 
between 1995 and 2018 on average by 8 pp  
to 39 %. (Stiglitz 2018, p. 95, EC 2018c).  
The downward trend in top personal income 
tax rates has stopped since 2009, with some 
countries adopting steep increases in the context 
of fiscal consolidation efforts, in particular  
Greece (+15 pp), Portugal (+11 pp), Slovenia  
(+9 pp) and Latvia (+6.4 pp). Other countries  
with already high top personal income tax  
rates also raised them further, which is  
the case for Luxembourg (+6.8 pp) and France 
(+6.1 pp). In addition, some countries which  
had initially adopted flat-tax systems,  
such as Czechia, Slovakia, Lithuania  
and Latvia, have since introduced progressivity  
in their tax systems. Figure 5.6 depicts some  
of these changes for certain exemplary  
countries and the EU.
5. Challenges for welfare states in the EU
Figure 5.5: Mean net replacement rates: baseline and hypothetical reform scenario (%) 
Notes: Calculations are based on EUROMOD simulations that compare the results of a baseline scenario 
(Baseline) where the self-employed are not covered by the existing unemployment insurance scheme with those  
of a counterfactual (Reform) scenario in which the self-employed would be eligible for unemployment insurance 
under the same conditions as employees. The figure shows the effect of the reform scenario on mean net 
replacement rates which measure the proportion of household disposable income that would be maintained if  
a member of the household fell into unemployment. The analysis assumes that the self-employed would be insured 
against unemployment risk at no extra cost to themselves. In addition, labour-supply disincentives, which might be 
associated with an extension of unemployment insurance coverage to the self-employed, are not accounted for.   
Source: Jara and Tumino (2018).
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Wealth is more unequally distributed than income, 
reinforcing public demand for policy action in this 
area (European Parliament 2018). For instance, 
many countries have only very limited or no 
taxation on net wealth.45 The main source of 
wealth-related taxes in the EU is housing taxation 
which can even be regressive (Barrios et al. 2016). 
Meanwhile, the downward trend in corporate 
income tax rates observed since the mid-1990 
tends to reinforce the view that tax systems are 
more lenient within the corporate sector. The 
average top statutory corporate income tax rate 
for the EU was 34.2 % in 1998, 23.7 % by 2008 
and 21.9 % by 2018. Recently, this trend has 
slowed down and tax rates have stabilised in 
many EU countries (EC 2018c). However, there is 
considerable heterogeneity in changes in tax rates 
across countries. Between 2008 and 2018, there 
were considerable reductions in Hungary (-10.1 
pp), the UK (-9.0 pp), Finland, Sweden and Greece 
(-6.0 pp) as well as increases in the top statutory 
corporate income tax rate for Latvia (+5 pp) and 
Portugal (+5 pp), for example.
Corporate tax avoidance is a matter of great policy 
concern at both international and EU levels. Leaked 
secret documents, such as the Panama Papers 
or the Paradise Papers, provide evidence for the 
widespread use of tax avoidance and evasion 
schemes through offshore entities, to the benefit 
of wealthy individuals and large corporations.46 
The European Commission has started several 
initiatives aimed at curbing aggressive tax planning 
and eliminating tax loopholes within the EU, 
including the proposal of a common corporate 
tax base (EC 2016b). The digital sector has also 
been under the spotlight, with major large internet 
companies being blamed for eluding taxes (Stiglitz 
2018; EC 2017b; d’Andria 2019), leading the 
Commission to take policy initiatives in this area, 
too (EC 2018d). Recent JRC work has analysed 
specific features of taxation systems which are 
important in the pursuit of fairness. They include the 
progressivity of personal income taxes, the taxation 
of wealth, the fiscal and social costs of tax evasion, 
and the issue of taxing companies in the digital era. 
The findings are discussed below. 
5. Challenges for welfare states in the EUs
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Figure 5.6: Top personal income tax rates, 2000-2019
Notes: Top statutory personal income tax rates, including general surcharges, are reported. The EU average is 
calculated for each year including only EU Member States at the time and using target and population weights. CZ: 
including a solidarity surcharge of 7 % (since 2013), EL: including a solidarity contribution (for years 2011-2016), FR: 
including a social welfare contribution and welfare debt repayment, LV: flat tax was replaced by three progressive tax 
rates in 2018, PT: including a solidarity surcharge (since 2013). 
Source: EC 2019, Taxes in Europe (database).
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  5.2.1 Increasing progressivity in flat-tax  
    countries: the potential for positive  
    equity and efficiency impacts47
 
In their transition towards market economies from 
the 1990s onwards, several countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe introduced flat personal 
income-tax schedules, typically featuring a single 
tax rate coupled with a basic tax allowance.  
In 2017, six countries in the EU still had flat-tax 
systems, namely Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, with flat personal 
income tax rates ranging from 10 % in Bulgaria to 
23 % in Latvia.48 Flat-tax systems are considered 
to be easier to administer and are also said to 
foster economic growth by reducing work and 
investment disincentives. However, this latter 
narrative is highly contested in academic research. 
According to Stiglitz (2018, p.96), there ‘is no 
evidence that these lower rates at the top (or lower 
inheritance and net-wealth taxes) have led to 
more growth. Indeed, empirical studies suggest 
that there is no relationship between lowering  
tax rates at the top and economic growth.’ 
Progressive tax structures (which tax higher 
incomes at increasing rates) are more common 
in the rest of the EU. Progressive taxation has 
two main advantages over flat taxes (Paulus and 
Tasseva 2018). They have more redistributive 
power and facilitate the absorption of economic 
shocks through so-called automatic stabilisers. 
5. Challenges for welfare states in the EU
The analyses of the tax-benefit systems presented 
in this chapter use EUROMOD, the EU’s tax-benefit 
microsimulation model (http://euromod.ac.uk).  
This model combines country-specific policy rules 
with representative household microdata (typically 
from the EU-SILC database). It simulates direct 
personal tax and social insurance contribution 
liabilities and cash benefit entitlements (including 
unemployment insurance). The model generates 
disposable individual and household income data and 
is therefore particularly suitable for distributional 
analysis. The simulations also incorporate fiscal 
effects and work-incentive data for groups according 
to socio-economic characteristics. When analysing 
a policy reform, the model is static and delivers the 
first-round effects (‘the overnight effect’). 
The study implementing more progressive personal 
income tax schedules on flat-tax countries uses 
as a baseline the policy systems of the countries 
under analysis relating to June 2017. To model 
the second-round effects of the tax reforms, 
EUROMOD is combined with the macroeconomic 
model QUEST. Second-round effects allow for 
individual behavioural effects to be considered (via 
box 5.2  EU tax-benefit microsimulation model
a labour supply model) and general equilibrium 
macroeconomic feedback effects.
 
The study on wealth-related taxes uses the wealth 
extension of EUROMOD, EWIGE, and microdata from 
the Household Finance and Consumption Survey 
(HFCS). It uses the national tax and benefit codes 
applying in June 2017 in the countries considered. 
The HFCS data used refer to 2013 or 2014, 
depending on the country. Monetary values were 
updated to 2017 using relevant price indices.
The study on income under-reporting by the self-
employed makes use of a recent application of EURO-
MOD that makes it possible to depart from the usual 
assumption of full tax compliance. The simulations 
are run on the tax-benefit rules in force in June 2018, 
using input data from the 2016 EU-SILC. Incomes 
reported in the 2016 EU-SILC refer to 2015.
In the study on social protection of atypical workers, 
the simulated tax-benefit rules refer to the 2017 
policy systems. Microdata are derived from the 
2015 EU-SILC and, for the UK, the 2014/15 Family 
Resource Survey.
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Automatic stabilisation results from the anticyclical 
working of the tax-benefit system, collecting higher 
taxes in boom times whilst allowing for an increase in 
household disposable income through lower taxes and 
higher social benefits in times of economic downturn. 
In this context, a recent JRC study (Barrios et al. 
2019) estimates the likely consequences of moving 
from a flat to a more progressive personal income 
tax schedule in the six EU countries featuring a 
flat-tax system in 2017 (see Box 5.2 for more 
information). The simulated reform assumes 
a progressive personal income tax schedule 
with three income tax brackets, coupled with a 
refundable in-work tax credit that would render 
the reforms budget-neutral in each country. The 
estimated effects of such a reform on income 
inequality and GDP growth are shown in Figure 5.7. 
Making tax systems more progressive would reduce 
income inequality in all countries. Importantly, on 
top of addressing equity issues, in the medium 
term, this kind of reform would also have a modest 
but positive impact on aggregate employment and 
GDP. These estimates result from a strong positive 
effect exerted by the progressive tax reform on 
low-skilled/low-income workers, which compensates 
for any negative impact on the highly skilled. 
  5.2.2 The budgetary and redistributive  
    effects of wealth-related taxes49 
EU countries’ difficult fiscal situation in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis and mounting 
evidence suggesting that wealth accumulation 
by the so-called ‘top 1 %’ has accelerated during 
recent decades justifies revisiting wealth-related 
taxes.50 Several EU countries have recently shown 
renewed interest in the use of wealth-related 
taxes as a way to reduce the high tax burden on 
labour, improve public finances and foster fairer 
tax systems. In 2016, wealth-related tax revenues 
in the EU only amounted to 1.7 % of GDP, with 
the property tax being the most revenue-bearing 
wealth-related tax.51
From a normative perspective, wealth is generally 
considered to be a major source of non-earned 
income, with long-lasting, exacerbating effects 
on inequality and adverse effects on equality of 
opportunity. Wealth-related taxes might therefore 
have a significant role in reducing inequalities, 
including those between generations (since wealth 
can be inherited). Besides these equity concerns, 
certain taxes levied on wealth, especially on 
immovable property, are often considered an option 
5. Challenges for welfare states in the EUs
Figure 5.7: The impact  
of increasing the pro-
gressivity of personal 
income tax in flat-tax 
countries on inequality 
and GDP growth  
(% change from 2017 
baseline)
Notes: Based on 
EUROMOD/QUEST 
simulations.  
Source: Barrios et al. 2019. 
-0.10
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
BG EE HU LT LV RO
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 c
ha
ng
e 
Gini disposable income
GDP impact:
GDP 2020
GDP 2021
GDP 2022
Long run
GDP 2019
69
for reducing the tax burden on labour and improving 
public finances. Another efficiency argument, 
however, points to the distortionary effects that 
some wealth-related taxes (e.g. taxes on financial 
and capital transactions and on net wealth) could 
have on savings and investment decisions.
A recent JRC study analyses wealth-related 
taxation in Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, 
Italy and Spain (see Box 5.2 and Thiemann and 
Agúndez García 2019 for more information).  
Figure 5.8 compares the Gini coefficient  
for market incomes (light-blue bars) with  
the wealth-based Gini coefficient (dark-blue bars). 
Wealth is distributed more unequally than market 
income. In the sample of countries considered,  
the inequality of net wealth is up to 30 pp higher 
than the inequality of market income (see also 
OECD 2018). The purple and yellow triangles  
in Figure 5.8 show the redistributive effects  
of wealth-related taxation and the overall tax-
benefit system without wealth-related taxation, 
respectively.52 While taxes and benefits, excluding 
wealth-related taxes, redistribute income  
in all countries (positive redistribution index),  
the redistributive effect of wealth-related taxes 
5. Challenges for welfare states in the EU
Figure 5.8: Income and wealth inequalities (Gini coefficients) and the redistributive effects of tax-benefit  
systems and wealth-related taxes 
Notes: The values of the Gini coefficient for measuring inequality are indicated on the left y-axis. The values  
of the redistribution index are indicated on the right y-axis. The redistribution index, excluding wealth-related 
taxes, is calculated as: GINI (market income) minus GINI (disposable income, after applying the tax-benefit 
system, with the exception of wealth-related taxes). The redistribution index due to wealth-related taxes is 
calculated as: GINI (disposable income, after applying the tax-benefit system, with the exception of wealth-related 
taxes) minus GINI (disposable income, after applying the tax-benefit system, including wealth-related taxes).  
Source: Thiemann and Agúndez García (2019).
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as currently designed is small or even slightly 
negative, implying in some cases an increase in 
income inequality. In the six European countries 
under scrutiny, the redistributive power of wealth-
related taxes is quite modest.
 
While this result should be treated with caution,  
as not all wealth-related taxes have been 
modelled in all countries because of data 
limitations, it highlights an issue in the current 
design of wealth-related taxes. More progressivity 
in wealth taxation and the reduction of options 
for tax deductions, which mainly benefit wealthy 
taxpayers, would improve the redistributive effect 
of wealth-related taxes. Such reforms should also 
be considered in light of country specificities and 
social preferences for redistribution.53 
  5.2.3 The fiscal and social cost of tax  
    evasion by the self-employed54 
Tax evasion is a major concern for fiscal policy in 
the EU.55 Not only does it limit countries’ capacity 
to finance their economic and social policies but 
it also violates the basic principles of tax justice. 
On the horizontal level, taxpayers with similar 
incomes end up paying different amounts of taxes, 
while on the vertical level, the redistributive effect 
of the tax-benefit system is reduced and, in some 
cases, individuals with higher incomes might well 
pay lower taxes than poorer individuals. 
Income under-reporting by individuals is believed 
to make up a large part of tax evasion as a 
whole. Arguably, the self-employed have more 
opportunities to under-report their income for  
tax purposes, since their income is typically  
not subject to third-party reporting.
Tax evasion is illegal and reliable figures on its 
magnitude in the EU are difficult to acquire. To 
improve understanding of this issue, a recent study 
(Kukk et al. 2018) estimates tax evasion among 
the self-employed in 14 EU countries by comparing 
differences in the consumption-income relationship 
of the self-employed and wage earners.56 
Estimates of tax evasion by the self-employed 
are reported in Figure 5.9. In Bulgaria and Cyprus, 
the self-employed under-report about 10 % of 
the income reported by employees. In Latvia, the 
country with the highest share of under-reported 
income, this figure rises to more than 40 %.
5. Challenges for welfare states in the EUs
Figure 5.9: Estimated income under-reporting, average tax burden and share of total income of the self-employed
Notes: The under-reporting of income is the estimated percentage of income under-reported by the self-
employed in relation to income reported by employees (using the Pissarides-Weber methodology). The average 
tax burden is the sum of direct taxes and social contributions in relation to market income, i.e. income before 
taxes and transfers, for the self-employed. The share of market income shows the ratio between the market 
income earned by the self-employed and that of the whole working population.  
Source: Kukk et al. (2018) [estimated under-reporting], JRC calculations [average tax burden] and EU-SILC 2016 [market income share].
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Recent JRC research (Agúndez García and Picos, 
2019, see Box 5.2 for further information) uses  
these estimates of tax evasion by the self-employed 
to quantify the implications for budgetary losses and 
income inequality (both shown in Figure 5.10). There 
is considerable variability in the estimated overall 
budgetary effects. In most countries, the estimated 
impact is below 0.6 % of GDP. However, in Ireland, 
it may go up to 0.9 % of GDP while in Greece, up 
to 1.6 % of GDP may be lost due to income under-
reporting by the self-employed, given the study’s 
assumptions. Most of the budgetary impacts are 
due to the loss of tax revenue and social insurance 
contributions. This form of tax evasion also increases 
income inequality for all countries in the sample, 
with the exception of Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania.  
In Ireland and Greece, income inequality is estimated 
to be more than 4 % higher due to income under-
reporting by the self-employed (see Figure 5.10). 
Among other reasons, this is because those self-
employed practising tax evasion are mainly in the 
top 20 % of the income distribution.
Given that tax evasion is illegal, the solution 
for this problem does not lie in the tax rules 
themselves. Instead, the creation of a civic spirit 
and improved monitoring and enforcement policies 
could be appropriate for reducing tax evasion. In 
contrast, tax avoidance is legal behaviour for which 
a remedy could be reformulation of the tax code.
  5.2.4 Corporate tax avoidance  
    in  the New Economy
International agreements on the taxation  
of multinational corporations’ profits are outdated 
and allow companies to engage in elaborate  
tax-avoidance schemes, saving them substantial 
tax payments. Globalisation is characterised by 
international and interlinked supply chains and a 
larger share of production managed by multinational 
companies. Together with the digitalisation of  
the economy, this has created the opportunity  
for certain companies to disconnect the location  
of economic activity from the place of taxation.  
5. Challenges for welfare states in the EU
Figure 5.10: Income 
under-reporting 
by self-employed 
individuals: estimated 
budgetary losses (% 
GDP) and impact on 
inequality (% change  
– Gini coefficient)
Source: Agúndez García 
and Picos (2019); based on 
EUROMOD simulations.
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More opportunities for profit shifting and tax-base 
erosion arise. In the EU, an estimated 35 % of the 
profits of multinational corporations are shifted 
to tax havens (Tørsløv et al. 2018). Profit shifting 
is easier for New Economy companies whose 
business models rely heavily on intangible assets 
like patents, trademarks, copyrights and data. 
Research by the JRC (d’Andria 2019) analyses 
the mismatch between the location of economic 
activity and the place of taxation for five large 
web companies in the two-year period 2015-2016.
 
Figure 5.11 depicts the share of web views  
of these companies originating from each country, 
expressed as the share of overall web views in all 
EU countries. Large countries (France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain) register high shares of web users 
and traffic. Figure 5.12 shows the total turnover  
of the same five companies in each EU country, 
expressed as a percentage of their total turnover  
in the EU. The concentration of turnover in  
a small number of countries and the mismatch 
with the geographical distribution of web views 
is immediately evident. Over 32 % of EU-wide 
turnover is concentrated in Ireland and around 28 % 
is located in Luxembourg. In turn, countries where 
the bulk of users and traffic are concentrated, 
report much smaller shares of turnover (below 4 %).
This indicates a mismatch between the place 
where economic activity occurs and the place 
where profits are reported and thus taxed. 
The most likely explanation is that web-based 
companies shift their profits to avoid taxes.  
This result indicates structural weaknesses in  
the existing international corporate tax system. 
This is not just limited to Europe. It is estimated 
that globally 40 % of multinationals’ profits  
(about EUR 530 billion) are shifted to tax havens  
(Wright and Zucman 2018; Tørsløv et al. 2018). 
Such tax-avoidance behaviour by multinational 
corporations results in considerable loss of 
government tax revenue and distorts competition 
since those companies which avoid taxes can offer 
lower prices. The prevalence of this behaviour in 
the New Economy is also evident from effective tax 
rates: companies with a digital business model in 
Europe have an effective tax rate between 8.5 % 
and 10.1 %. This compares to an effective tax rate 
for traditional companies with fewer profit-shifting 
opportunities of about 20.9 % to 23.3 % (EC 2017b). 
It is important to note that digital companies  
do not behave illegally. Tax-avoidance behaviour 
is made possible by loopholes in the existing tax 
laws and in some cases is enabled by conscious 
policy decisions by national governments (Stiglitz 
2018). These findings indicate the need for 
coordinated action at the EU level. 
5.3 Concluding remarks
The evidence provided in this chapter suggests 
that EU Member States’ tax and social-benefit 
systems offer a significant buffer against adverse 
income developments, although in some cases 
the efforts required to sustain these systems have 
been unequally shared among the population. 
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Figure 5.12:  
Distribution of turnover 
of top web-based 
companies, % of EU 
total of five companies' 
turnover
Source: d’Andria (2019).
Figure 5.11:  
Distribution of web 
views of five large web 
companies across EU 
countries, % of EU total 
of the companies’ views
Notes: Aggregation  
of web domains by 
company group was 
performed by the JRC. 
Dark shading implies 
higher number of views.
Source: d’Andria (2019); data 
from the SimilarWeb database 
for the years 2016-2017.
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The Great Recession has seriously challenged  
their efficacy and long-term financial viability.  
The now dominant view is that these systems 
need significant reforms. For example, tax 
contributions are often perceived as being unfairly 
distributed among taxpayers. This view is partly 
confirmed by recent JRC research summarised in 
this chapter, suggesting that in some instances 
wealthy people and multinational companies 
succeed in ‘escaping’ the tax system via tax 
avoidance or tax evasion. The greatest challenges 
for reforming welfare and tax systems lay ahead. 
Major structural changes are likely to have 
significant implications both for economic activity 
and for the financing of (and degree of protection 
provided by) welfare systems. For instance, 
digitalisation is a pervasive phenomenon blurring 
the traditional nexus between the generation  
of economic value and social welfare. Atypical 
forms of work (e.g. teleworking, homeworkers, 
part-time workers and the self-employed) are also 
becoming increasing ‘typical’. This means that a 
growing share of the workforce neither contributes 
to nor benefits from basic social-protection 
safety nets which are still grounded on the one-
job/one-workplace/regular salary model. This 
chapter highlights some specific areas of policy 
intervention such as the progressivity of the tax 
system, wealth taxation, tax evasion, taxation of 
the digital sector, and extending social protection 
to atypical workers. Evidence on the potential 
fiscal and redistributive impacts of hypothetical 
policy-reform scenarios is an important step 
towards motivating actual policy action.
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Fairness matters
Many Europeans enjoy high living standards, 
paired with – when compared internationally 
– low income inequality and high levels of 
government redistribution. Nevertheless, many 
Europeans perceive their lives as being unfair. This 
perception is likely to undermine trust in traditional 
institutions and gives rise to social discontent. 
Fairness is high on the EU political agenda, but 
what is known about the perception of fairness 
in European societies? There are several notions 
of fairness, many of which include elements 
of equality of outcomes (such as income) and 
equality of opportunity. The latter implies that 
unequal outcomes are tolerable to the extent that 
they are driven by differences in merit and effort 
and not by the consequences of circumstances 
which are out of individuals’ control. This report 
does not embrace one specific fairness definition 
but presents snapshots of different but related 
fairness perspectives to inform policy. 
Fairness is a subjective feeling in the eyes of the 
beholder. With this in mind, the JRC commissioned 
a special Eurobarometer on ‘Fairness, inequality 
and intergenerational mobility’ (EC 2018e) to 
assess individual perspectives of fairness. Based 
on this survey, Chapter 2 of the report presents 
some descriptive statistics on fairness perceptions 
across Europe, highlighting differences across 
macro-regions and socio-economic groups. The 
chapter also discusses how fairness perceptions 
are related to well-functioning societies and 
individuals’ well-being.
 
Given the importance of equality of outcomes for 
fairness perceptions, Chapter 3 presents some 
stylised facts on income inequality for the whole of 
the EU before, during and after the Great Recession.  
‘Inequality of outcome among today’s generation 
is the source of the unfair advantage received by 
the next generation’ (Atkinson 2015). In unequal 
societies, unequal opportunities are offered to 
children so that an individual’s social status strongly 
depends on family background. If this is the case, 
‘the best advice we can give to a poor child, keen 
to get ahead through education, is to choose richer 
parents’ (Connell, 1995). Chapter 4 therefore focuses 
on whether and by how much intergenerational 
mobility in education varies across Europe and how 
much it has changed across birth cohorts. 
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Welfare state arrangements with their respective 
tax and benefit systems provide an important 
buffer against adverse shocks. However,  
the structural changes the EU is facing put the 
existing welfare systems increasingly under 
pressure. Chapter 5 addresses a number of related 
topics and discusses options for fiscal and social-
protection interventions which are important  
in the pursuit of an inclusive and fair EU.  
This closing chapter focuses on some key 
conclusions drawn from the analysis and 
discussions in previous chapters.
 
Fairness, inequality and redistribution
Around 22 % of Europeans perceive their lives 
as unfair, while more than half of all Europeans 
perceive their life as fair. However, these average 
figures conceal substantial differences across socio-
economic groups and European macro-regions. 
People who are unemployed or have low income 
seldom agree that their life is fair. In Southern and 
Eastern Europe, the perception that life is fair is 
rather low. These perceptions of limited fairness 
need to be heard and acted upon since fairness 
is linked to general well-being. The advantages of 
a fair society need not come at the cost of less-
efficient economies and weaker growth.  
On the contrary, fairness and inclusiveness  
have the potential to promote competitiveness  
and growth.
Inequality is at the forefront of public debate. An 
analysis of EU-wide income inequality between 
2006 and 2016 across the entire income 
distribution and for different income components 
reveals some clear macro-regional dynamics. In 
North-Western Europe, income levels declined 
proportionally among all income groups, while 
income inequality in this macro-region was 
stable and relatively low. In Central and Eastern 
Europe, incomes rose for almost all individuals 
and inequality did not change substantially. In 
contrast, inequality in Southern Europe increased 
significantly from 2006 until 2014. In this region, 
the increase in income inequality was mainly due to 
a growing income gap between median earners and 
the poor. The Southern European poor could not 
catch up after the financial crisis. 
In Europe, individuals’ fortunes are closely tied to 
family background. About 74 % of Europeans with 
highly educated parents go on to complete higher 
education themselves, compared to only 28 % of 
those with less highly educated parents. Social 
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status persistence has a dynastic component: 
the gap in educational attainment rises by 10 pp 
when also taking into account the influence of 
grandparents on lifetime prospects. Social mobility 
differs between European regions. In Eastern, 
Western and Southern Europe, the persistence 
of educational attainment across generations 
is much stronger than in Northern Europe and 
the Baltics. In Northern Europe, offspring with 
more highly educated parents and grandparents 
have, on average, ‘just’ a 37 pp higher probability 
themselves of completing higher education 
compared to their counterparts with less-
favourably educated parents and grandparents. 
The persistence increases up to 57 pp for Southern 
Europe, indicating that this region has the lowest 
level of social mobility and the highest inequality 
of opportunity. This suggests that there is only 
limited intergenerational mobility in the EU.
The social model of European welfare states is 
unique in providing collective insurance against 
risks which are not or are only insufficiently 
insurable in the market. Technological change, 
globalisation and demographic change create 
new demands and challenges for existing welfare 
state arrangements. Atypical employment is on 
the rise, resulting in increasing shares of workers 
not properly covered by current social-insurance 
mechanisms. On the financing side, tax evasion and 
tax avoidance are major concerns for EU Member 
States’ fiscal policy. Tax avoidance is the result of 
a corporate taxation system which is no longer 
in line with fluid and intangible economies. Tax 
evasion violates the basic principles of tax justice. 
These challenges limit the financing capacity of 
EU Member States to uphold their social contract. 
There is room to revive the social contract through 
policy interventions on tax evasion, taxation of the 
digital sector and by adjusting social-protection 
systems to the new world of work. 
Future outlook
Moral considerations of fairness and justice 
touch upon all aspects of life: from within-family 
relative bargaining power and resource sharing to 
community interactions, from the local  
provision of public goods to the mitigation  
of and adaptation to climate change.  
Questions of redistribution, process and 
responsibility are omnipresent. This JRC 
Fairness Report is based on cross-national and 
interdisciplinary research from across  
the JRC. With the intention of supporting a broad 
European-wide discourse on fairness in the EU,  
the report presents and synthesises recent 
findings on aspects of the perception of fairness, 
European–wide income inequality, educational 
persistence, social policy and taxation. 
Given the multidimensionality of fairness, this 
report necessarily overlooks several important 
and timely topics relevant to the issue. Next to 
inequalities of income, inequality of wealth, health 
or subjective well-being are other important 
examples of outcomes distributed unevenly across 
Europe’s societies. Furthermore, several horizontal 
inequalities, such as gender and environmental 
inequalities, have not been addressed. These issues 
will be tackled in future JRC research to continue 
support for an EU discourse towards a fairer Union.
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 BHPS British Household Panel Survey
 ESS European Social Survey
 EU European Union
 EU-SILC European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
 GDP Gross Domestic Product
 SOEP Socio-Economic Panel
 OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
 pp Percentage points
 PPS Purchasing power standards
 R&D Research and development
1 See https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research/crosscutting-activities/fairness/community
2 See https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research/crosscutting-activities/fairness/survey
3 These numbers are based on 2016 data for 16 European countries. Life expectancy broken down  
by educational level is not available for all EU countries.
4 The European Commission’s Reflection Paper on the Social Dimension of Europe (EC 2017a) discusses similar 
challenges and consequences. The present report takes a slightly different perspective by focusing on fairness 
and is based on recent evidence. The conclusions drawn are often in line with those of the Reflection Paper.
5 Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024,  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf
6 The European Pillar of Social Rights is accompanied by a social scoreboard which monitors the 
implementation of the Pillar across EU countries. See https://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/social-
scoreboard/ for additional information on the set of indicators., Proposal for a Council Recommendation on 
access to social protection for workers and the self-employed, COM(2018) 132 final,  
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2018:0132:FIN 
7 Proposal for a Council Recommendation on High Quality Early Childhood Education and Care Systems, 
SWD(2018) 173 final, Brussels, 22.5.2018 COM(2018) 271 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.
html?uri=cellar:05aa1e50-5dc7-11e8-ab9c-01aa75ed71a1.0003.02/DOC_1&format=PDF 
8 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A strong Social Europe for Just Transition, COM(2020) 14 final, 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1580393189643&uri=CELEX:52020DC0014 
9 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic  
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. The European Green Deal, COM(2019) 640 final 
 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european-green-deal-communication_en.pdf
10 Fairness norms and fairness perceptions exhibit cross-national variation and change over the life cycle (Lesorogol 
2017; Marien and Werner 2019). The context also seems to be important: unfavourable decisions taken by a group 
tend to be perceived as more unfair than if an individual had made the very same decision (Kouchaki et al. 2015).
11 For convenience The Eurobarometer on Fairness, inequality and intergenerational mobility will be referred to 
as Eurobarometer on Fairness.
12 Country groupings are detailed in Annex 3.
13 These general geographic and socio-demographic patterns are in line with the findings presented in the JRC 
Policy Brief ‘Europeans’ perceptions of fairness’ (Dessart and Marandola 2019).
14 Different normative theories, with different implications for what people can be held responsible for, are 
available in the literature; see Cappelen et al. (2010).
15 The measurement and definition of well-being has been subject to extensive coverage in the literature 
over recent decades. This section will be limited to presenting some findings related to the most common 
measures and definitions of well-being, albeit it acknowledges the complexity of the topic. For more detailed 
reviews, see Diener (1984), Diener et al. (1999) and Diener (2012).
16 This might explain why early research on the link between inequality and happiness (Alesina et al. 2004) 
found a weaker correlation between them in the USA than in the EU. 
17 Dessart and Mirandola (2019) measure country-level perception of fairness through agreement with the 
statements that ‘I am confident that justice always prevails over injustice in our country’, ‘I believe that, by 
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and large, people get what they deserve in our country’ and ‘In our country, the political decisions are applied 
consistently to all citizens’. To assess the perception of life fairness, instead they adopt the agreement rates 
to the statements ‘I believe that most of the things that happen in my life are fair’ and ‘I think that important 
decisions that are made concerning me are usually taken in a fair way’.
18 As Julian Le Grand (1990) points out, the nature of such a potential trade-off depends on the definition of efficiency 
with rather different implications if efficiency is defined on the base of Pareto optimality on economic growth.
19 Chapter 5 takes a closer look at the foundations, achievements and challenges of the welfare state.
20 Intergenerational social mobility, with a focus on education, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
21 In contrast, Perugini and Martino (2008) find results which suggest a positive relationship between  
inequality and growth in European regions.
22 Developments in China are summarised in greater detail in the recent JRC Report ‘China – Challenges  
and Prospects from an Industrial and Innovation Powerhouse’ (Preziosi et al. 2019).
23 Calculating EU-wide income distribution has stringent data availability and comparability requirements.  
See Benczúr et al. (2017) for more details. 
24 No data is available for Croatia. 
25 Note the different scales in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6.
26 Low-skilled workers in more developed countries have recently suffered less from automatisation and 
digitalisation since a large number of these jobs had already been cut in the past (EC 2018a, p.62).
27 Patents have long been used as a proxy for technological innovations (Dosi et al. 1990; Eaton and Kortum 
1999; Kortum 1997; Hagedoorn and Cloodt 2003).
28 Structural changes in employment relations are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
29 To tackle possible endogeneity issues, the generalised method of moments and instrumental variable 
identification strategies are employed.
30 Information on the socio-economic status of grandmothers is not available. 
31 Motivated beliefs entail affective or instrumental reasons for an individual to deviate from objective cognition (e.g. 
rational ignorance). Bénabou and Tirole (2016) provide a comprehensive discussion on motivated beliefs and their 
production. Heuristics and biases (e.g. confirmation bias) are also important explanations of cognitive mistakes.
32 When positioning their parents and themselves on the imaginary 10-point social ladder, respondents  
have not been explicitly asked to compare themselves with their parents. 
33 It is reasonable to assume that individuals report their parents’ highest social status. However, for many of the 
younger individuals (e.g. Generation X), the social status might still improve which implies that self-perceived 
social mobility might be underestimated.
34 It is difficult to disentangle parental characteristics and exposure to different neighbourhood environments 
given that the choice of the latter is not random with respect to the family background. Recent research 
relying on administrative data tried to address the issue and quantify the effect of long-term exposure to a 
poor neighbourhood on individual outcomes. See, for instance, Chetty et al. (2014) and Hedman et al. (2017).
35 See Peragine and Biagi (2019, forthcoming).
36 More details on social expenditure in the EU are provided by Eurostat at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
documents/2995521/9665811/2-15032019-BP-EN.pdf/2340c61d-9dc5-4b5f-9b13-db36ff01c082
37 In international global rankings on income inequality, corruption perception, the quality of health services 
and environmental performance, EU Member States are generally among the top performers. In all rankings, 
about half of the best-performing 30 countries are EU Member States. See Table 4.1 in Annex 4.
38 Schwellnus et al. (2018) in particular find that the labour share has declined by around 3.5 pp in a sample of 
17 OECD countries over the period 1995-2011.
39 A more detailed description of developments which can be expected to profoundly shape the world we live in 
are captured by the concept of megatrends: see https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/foresight_en
40 Detailed treatment of horizontal inequality can be found in, for example, Bussolo et al. (2019, p.39).
41 For details on demographic developments in the EU, see the JRC Report on Demographic Profiles.
42 Due to innovations in ICT and global access to the internet, the phenomenon of globalisation extends  
far beyond the integration of national economies into a global market to domains touching on social norms, 
state sovereignty, etc.
43 This section is based on the recent Fairness Policy Brief ‘Old welfare in new labour markets? The social 
protection of atypical workers’ (Jara and Tumino 2019).  
44 Principle 12 of the European Pillar of Social Rights on social protection states: ‘Regardless of the type and 
duration of their employment relationship, workers, and, under comparable conditions, the self-employed, 
have the right to adequate social protection’.
45 The taxation of net wealth has been abandoned in many EU countries. For an overview and discussion  
of wealth taxation, see Drometer et al. (2018). 
46 See in particular: https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/
47 This section is based on the Fairness Policy Brief entitled ‘Increasing progressivity in flat-tax countries: 
potential positive equity and efficiency impacts’, (Barrios et al. 2019).
48 Note that Latvia adopted a progressive tax system on 1 January 2018.
49 This section is based on the Fairness Policy Brief ‘The budgetary and redistributive effects of wealth-related 
taxes’ (Thiemann and Agúndez García 2019).
50 See in particular Piketty (2013) and Alvaredo et al. (2013).
51 For most EU countries, wealth-related taxation is essentially represented by recurrent property taxes on 
immovable property. Currently, only Spain applies a tax on net wealth. France recently reformed its wealth 
tax, keeping only immovable property within the definition of wealth. Interestingly, in the 1970s, many EU 
countries featured wealth taxes which were progressively removed; see Krenek and Schratzenstaller (2018) 
and Drometer et al. (2018).
52 Wealth-related taxes are assumed to be paid from income.
53 Preferences for redistribution are discussed in Chapter 3, Box 3.3.
54 This section is based on the Fairness Policy Brief ‘The fiscal and social cost of tax evasion: the impact  
of under-reporting of income by the self-employed’, Agúndez Garcia and Picos (2019).
55 For EU activities against tax avoidance and tax evasion see, for example: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_
customs/fight-against-tax-fraud-tax-evasion
56 Self-reported consumption is assumed to be reported correctly while self-reported income can be under-
reported. It is further assumed that wage earners report their income correctly, a rather unproblematic 
assumption since taxes on wages are often directly deducted by the employer.
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WORKSHOP 
Towards an Absolute Measure of Poverty in the EU  
organised by the JRC Finance and Economy Unit 
30 September 2019 
This workshop explored the latest developments in the measurement and monitoring of absolute poverty in the EU.  
Drawing on expertise from policymakers, academics and stakeholders, it discussed the methodological challenges  
and possible solutions for estimating poverty. It also explored the substantial differences emerging when using  
an absolute as opposed to a relative measure of poverty.
BOOK LAUNCH  
Socio-economic Inequality and Student Outcomes: Cross-National Trends, Policies and Practices  
organised by the JRC Monitoring, Indicators and Impact Evaluation Unit 
14 October 2019 
How much is pupils’ achievement at school shaped by their family background? How have national trends evolved  
and what policies can offset socio-economic disadvantages? This event launched the eponymous Springer book  
which addresses these questions by connecting country-specific policy choices with student outcomes.
WORKSHOP 
The Behavioural Aspects of Fairness  
organised by the JRC Foresight, Modelling, Behavioural Insights and Design for Policy Unit 
10 December 2019 
This workshop investigated how insights from psychology and behavioural economics might improve our understanding  
of the determinants of individuals’ perceptions of fairness. It also discussed how such perceptions influence  
the formation of individual policy-related preferences. 
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Published JRC policy briefs 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/page/fairness-policy-briefs-series-182382
 Like (grand)parent, like child? Multigenerational persistence of socio-economic status in the European Union  
 Marco Colagrossi, Béatrice d’Hombres and Sylke V. Schnepf
 Income inequality and support for redistribution across Europe  
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 Sensing global patterns of inequality from space 
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 Studying abroad – benefits and unequal uptake 
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 EU employment from 2000 to 2014: factors behind (uneven) sectorial and regional dynamics  
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 Europeans’ perception of fairness  
 François J. Dessart and Ginevra Marandola
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 Increasing progressivity in flat-tax countries: potential positive equity and efficiency impacts  
 Anamaria Maftei
 The fiscal and social cost of tax evasion: the impact of under-reporting of income by the self-employed  
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 Old welfare in new labour markets? The social protection of atypical workers 
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 The budgetary and redistributive effects of wealth-related taxes 
 Andreas Thiemann and Ana Agúndez Garcia
 The Mediterranean poor: a key component of EU-wide income inequality 
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Forthcoming policy briefs
 Socio-economic background and educational inequalities 
 Louis Volante, Sylke V. Schnepf, John Jerrim and Don A. Klinger
 The unbearable intangibility of the internet: taxing companies in the digital era 
 Diego d'Andria 
 Anti-establishment vote in European regions 
 Nicola Pontarollo and Chiara Ferrante
 Equality of opportunity: theory, measurement and policy implications  
 Federico Biagi
 Key facets of the fairness of tax and social benefit systems in the EU 
 Ana Agúndez Garcia and Salvador Barrios
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 ANNEX 3 
 DEFINITION OF EU COUNTRY GROUPS AND ABBREVIATIONS
 AT Austria
 BE Belgium
 BG  Bulgaria
 CY Cyprus
 CZ Czechia
 DE Germany
 DK Denmark
 EE Estonia
 EL Greece
 ES Spain
 FI Finland
 FR France
 HR Croatia
 HU Hungary
 IE Ireland
 IT Italy
 LT Lithuania
 LV Latvia
 LU Luxembourg
 MT Malta
 NL Netherlands
 PL Poland
 PT Portugal
 RO Romania
 SE Sweden
 SI Slovenia
 SK Slovakia
 UK United Kingdom
EU countries and abbreviations
Country groups 1
Country classification used in the report
North-Western EU (NW): AT, BE, DE, DK, FI, FR, IR, LU, NL, SE, UK
Southern EU (SE): CY, EL, IT, ES, MT, PT
Central and Eastern EU (CEE): BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK, SI
Country groups 2
Baltic: EE, LT, LV
Benelux: BE, LU, NL
East: BG, CZ, HR, HU, PL, RO, SI, SK
North: DK, FI, SE
South: CY, EL, IT, MT, PT, ES
West: AT, DE, IE, FR, UK
 ANNEX 4 
PERFORMANCE OF EU COUNTRIES IN SEVERAL 
INTERNATIONAL RANKINGS
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czechia
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
First 10
First 20
First 30
Total countries
GI
21
11
57
23
40
4
13
32
7
32
24
53
20
25
47
42
57
39
19
13
22
48
51
6
2
54
18
35
4
10
15
107
GGGI
53
32
18
59
92
81
13
33
4
12
14
78
102
9
68
17
22
59
90
27
42
37
63
81
11
29
3
15
3
10
13
149
CPI
16
16
71
57
42
42
2
21
3
23
12
59
66
19
54
40
38
8
46
8
36
29
59
54
34
42
6
8
6
10
13
180
WPFI
11
7
111
69
25
34
9
12
4
33
15
74
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16
46
24
36
17
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3
58
14
44
27
32
31
2
40
5
11
14
180
EPI
8
15
30
41
24
33
3
48
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2
13
22
43
9
16
37
29
7
4
18
50
26
45
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34
12
5
6
9
14
20
180
HDI
20
18
51
46
32
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11
30
15
24
5
31
45
4
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41
35
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29
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52
38
25
26
7
14
4
9
17
189
DI
16
31
46
60
35
34
5
23
8
29
13
39
57
6
33
38
36
12
18
11
54
27
66
44
36
19
3
14
4
11
14
167
Table: Performance of EU countries in several international rankings
Notes: All rankings reported are based on the 2018 indexes, except for the CPI (2017) and the Gini Index (most 
recent index between 2014 and 2017). 
Source: Rankings computed by the authors based on indexes from World Bank (GI - Gini Index), World Economic Forum (GGGI – 
Global Gender Gap Index), Transparency International (CPI – Corruption Perception Index), Reporters Without Borders (WPFI – World 
Press Freedom Index), Yale University (EPI – Environmental Performance Index), United Nations (HDI – Human Development Index), 
Economist Intelligence Unit (DI – Democracy Index).
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GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU
IN PERSON
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find 
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